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ABSTRACT
THE INFORMED HUMAN FIREWALL: THE IMPACT OF KNOWLEDGE
DIMENSIONS ON EMPLOYEES SECURE BEHAVIOR
By
Ashraf Mady
Organizations implement a variety of knowledge mechanisms such as information
security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs and information security
policies to influence employees’ secure behavior. However, skills gained through these
knowledge mechanisms have not always translated to secure behavior. Protection
motivation theory (PMT) is a widely used and accepted theory in information security
behavioral research. Nevertheless, information security research has not examined the
impact of knowledge mechanisms on PMT psychological processes. This study explains
the key psychological processes that influence employees’ secure behavior and seeks to
understand how organizational knowledge mechanisms influence these key psychological
processes that form threats perceptions.
Drawing on the knowledge management literature, the impact of knowledge
mechanisms on users’ threat perceptions was conceptualized and examined across three
knowledge dimensions: breadth, depth, and finesse. The research also applied construal
level theory (CLT) to provide a means to measure the psychological constructs of PMT
from an individual’s perspective. The research conceptualizes the PMT psychological
process based on the threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. The four dimensions of
vii

the psychological distance from CLT (temporal, social, spatial, and hypothetical) formed
the threat un-desirability while response efficacy and difficulty formed the coping
feasibility construct.
This study empirically tested the model using a multi-method approach. The first
method used an experiment with 262 students to validate the CLT driven constructs and
its impact on protection motivation. The second study tested the overall model, including
knowledge mechanisms dimensions, across a sample of 219 industry professionals. The
theoretical model was tested using a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach.
Results show support that the psychological distance from the threat allows employees to
perceive the personal impact of the threat. Results also support that the key
psychological constructs, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, influence
employees behavioral choices.
This research offers noteworthy contributions to the literature. It provides a
greater understanding of the role of knowledge dimensions to motivate compliance. The
research also presented an improved model that preserves the original intent of PMT in
the context information security. Finally, the research presented a generalizable and
practical business approach to a traditionally technical topic.
Keywords: Information security, secure behavior, compliance, construal level theory,
knowledge dimensions, protection motivation, security policies, security education and
training awareness, SETA programs, information security threats.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
The rapid transformation of organizational critical information to digital format
drastically increased the importance of information security (Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila,
2018). The motivation of employees to handle information in a secure manner has
become a top organizational priority (Anderson, Vance, Kirwan, Eargle, & Jenkins,
2016). Organizations are struggling to protect their critical information from intentional
and accidental information security violations committed by employees (Johnston, 2015).
Consequently, organizations continue to invest in information security solutions such as
intrusion detection systems, network traffic monitoring, software and network security,
incident management, identity and access management (Ernst & Young, 2016). The
purpose of this research is to understand how employees can be motivated to protect
organizational digital assets from information security threats.
Information security is concerned with protecting information from accidental or
malicious security incidents such as exposure of confidential information (threat to
information privacy) (Arachchilage & Love, 2014), deletion of data (threat to information
availability) (Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016), and data modification (threat to
information integrity) (Sen & Borle, 2015). The threats to the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information have evolved to include accidental or intentional damage,
destruction, theft, unintended or unauthorized modification, or other misuse from human
or nonhuman threats (Whitman & Mattord, 2012). Security incidents may have dire
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consequences such as financial and legal liabilities, loss of reputation, negative economic
impact, or employees’ demotivation (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010).
The growing global spending on security solutions and services was estimated to
reach $86 billion in 2016 to counter the increasing impact of security incidents (Anderson
et al., 2016). The damaging cost of data breaches was reported in 2017 to be larger in
size than any time before, with a global average cost of $3.62 million per data breach
(Ponemon Institute, 2017). A market study showed that more than half of the surveyed
global organizations reported the need to increase their security budgets by at least 25%
to effectively protect organizational information assets against growing threats (Kessel &
Allan, 2015). However, despite the spending growth on organizational initiatives to
secure information, security incidents continue to occur, and their damaging impact
continue to grow (Ab Rahman & Choo, 2015; Safa et al., 2016; Willison & Warkentin,
2013). As a result, information security compliance has become a major research topic
(Crossler et al., 2013) and a key managerial interest (Kappelman et al., 2017; Willison &
Warkentin, 2013).
Information systems are sociotechnical networks of resources and capabilities that
dynamically connect the technical and social subsystems in an organization (Chatterjee,
Sarker, & Valacich, 2015; Griffith & Dougherty, 2001). Therefore, employees’
behaviors have a significant impact on information security (Herath & Rao, 2009a).
Earlier approaches to secure these systems have focused primarily on technical solutions
such as intrusion detection systems, firewall protection, and security systems design and
implementation (Crossler et al., 2013). These technical countermeasure solutions are
designed mostly to protect against external threats and are therefore often ineffective
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against employees’ information security violations (Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, 2013).
Hence, relying on technology-based solutions alone is not enough to eliminate threats to
organizations (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Surveys of major information security breaches
show that most breaches are a result of insiders’ threats rather than external threats
(Crossler et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). In addition, external threats are
targeting people’s behaviors rather than computers to breach security (Sohrabi Safa, Von
Solms, & Furnell, 2016).
Emerging literature concerned with information security advocates that the
security of information systems is as much a behavioral issue as it is a technical issue
(Burns, Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2017; Chatterjee et al., 2015; Da Veiga & Martins,
2015). Research has shown that successful information security can be achieved when
organizations invest in both technical and behavioral controls (Bulgurcu et al., 2010;
Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012). Despite this, organizations continue to focus on
technical controls underestimating behavioral risks (D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 2014).
This is particularly important because researchers estimate that nearly half of information
security breaches are caused by employees from within the organization (Tsohou,
Karyda, & Kokolakis, 2015). Behavioral aspects are tough to research and explain with
consistency. Thus, researchers have recommended continued focus on factors to
influence employees’ secure behavior.
Organizations implement a variety of mechanisms to distribute knowledge to
influence employees’ secure behavior (Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015).
Dominant among these knowledge mechanisms are information security policies
(Doherty, Anastasakis, & Fulford, 2009; Sommestad & Hallberg, 2013) and security
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education, training, and awareness programs (SETA) (Whitman, 2003). Practitioners and
academic scholars continue to support the dominance of these organizational knowledge
mechanisms to persuade employees’ secure behavior (Johnston et al., 2015; Mathews,
2016; Moody et al., 2018).
Information security policies are articulated knowledge regarding the compliance
with general organizational regulations and procedures to limit the discretion of
subordinates (Knapp, Morris, Marshall, & Byrd, 2009). SETA programs provide
information security knowledge that leads to comprehension, familiarity, and skills to
manage security incidents (Safa et al., 2016). However, researchers have found that
SETA programs and the creation of policies and procedures have not always translated to
the desirable behavior (Safa et al., 2016; Sommestad, Karlzén, & Hallberg, 2015).
Consequently, researchers have called for the need to understand how knowledge
translates to behavior in a specific situation (Burns et al., 2017). In the scope of this
research, the specific situation is a particular threat context. Information security threat
context is the circumstances that exploit vulnerability that can cause damage to
information security attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Fenz &
Ekelhart, 2009). The desired behavior when dealing with any threat context (hereafter
referred to as secure behavior) is the way in which employees act to protect information
security attributes, which goes beyond compliance. Thus, the key overarching research
question is:
How do knowledge mechanisms such as policies and SETA programs influence
employees’ secure behavior in a particular threat context?
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To address this question, this research aims to understand the influence of policies
and SETA programs on employees’ psychological processes that create states and beliefs.
The psychological process of any event determines individuals’ behavior regarding this
event (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). Researchers have argued the need to
understand how individuals make information security related decisions (Tsohou et al.,
2015). This research studies employees’ psychological processes to explain how
individuals make security related decisions. The degree to which people believe they
have control and the ability to implement threat countermeasures plays an important role
in people’s perception of threat prevention (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). Also
the context of the threat is relevant to the psychological state regarding the harmful
outcomes (Wu, Stanton, Li, Galbraith, & Cole, 2005). Therefore, employees’
psychological processes are influenced by the knowledge regarding information security
threat in a specific context. The present research explores the context of the threat at the
individual level as well as the organizational knowledge in order to examine employees’
psychological processes.
1.1 The Context of Threat
The context of the threat could be known and addressed in security policies,
known but not addressed yet in organizational policies, or unknown and ambiguous.
Each threat to information systems is distinct and requires specific assessment, priority,
and countermeasures (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008). Therefore, while the overall process
to secure information systems might be the same, the process that describes the action
from employees regarding specific threats needs be contextualized distinctly based on the
specific context of the threat. Examining the context of threats to information security
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can clarify the circumstances that may influence employees’ psychological state and how
knowledge mechanisms can prepare employees to deal with threats that they may face. It
is important to understand threat context to ensure that all major threats are explained and
to understand the associated major countermeasures available to employees (Friedman &
Hoffman, 2008). Without the contextualization of information security threats,
employees may believe that they are invulnerable to threats against organizational
information systems (Johnston et al., 2015).
Threats to the security of information systems can be categorized as external
threats caused by hackers, competitors, and natural disasters or as internal threats caused
by employees’ behavior, whether malicious or accidental (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin,
1992). Human behavior can expose information systems to threats such as data breaches
or the unauthorized access to sensitive and confidential information (Chatterjee et al.,
2015; Ifinedo, 2012), viruses and malware can destroy critical data (Boss, Galletta,
Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2015), damage or stolen
computers and laptops (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014), hacking, spoofing,
phishing, policy violation, or opportunism for personal gain (Chatterjee et al., 2015).
Also threats can come from natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, or floods
that destroy organizations’ infrastructures or equipment, which prevent physical access to
systems or causing loss of critical data (Loch et al., 1992).
Threats can come from software infected with computer programs, called
spyware, that collect data and monitor user activities (Chatterjee et al., 2015; Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010). In addition, spam emails or suspicious websites can threaten data
privacy and confidentiality (Ifinedo, 2012; Posey et al., 2015). Furthermore, threats from
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the use of unauthorized equipment or software or from violating organizational use
policies can expose or destroy confidential information (Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila,
2012).
Researchers in the psychology domain found that the context of a threat
influences an individual’s psychological state because it explains the degree of harm
associated with the threat (Wu et al., 2005). Threat context enables employees to
understand and assess threats (Babar, Mahalle, Stango, Prasad, & Prasad, 2010). A
user’s psychological state can influence his or her evaluation and facilitate the
development of favorable behavioral intentions (Ho, Ke, & Liu, 2015). Thus, this
research focuses on clarifying the psychological attributes of the threat environment to
distinguish between threats and to see how such attributes affects the downstream actions
of an individual.
1.2 Knowledge Mechanisms: Organizational Security Policy and Training
Knowledge regarding compliance in the organization is gained by articulated
processes and procedures (Sanchez, 1997) or through training (S. Gupta, Bostrom, &
Huber, 2010). Information security policies and SETA programs have widely been
established in the organizations as the sources for knowledge to safeguard and secure
information (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2015). Information security policies
communicate compliance requirements, incidents definition, and information risk
management in order to assess awareness pertaining to information protection (Da Veiga
& Martins, 2015). Security policies serve as internal regulation and law with the
intention to direct the behaviors of employees toward information security (Chen et al.,
2015). SETA programs are procedural mechanisms implemented in the organization so
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that information security becomes a natural inherent aspect in employees daily jobs
(Chen et al., 2015). Researchers suggested that SETA programs are recommended to
enable security polices because employees need to be trained, educated, and motivated to
follow security policies and procedures (Chen et al., 2015). Organizations implement
security policies and SETA programs with great variations depending on various factors,
such as: industry, size of the organization, degree of information intensity in the
organization, and the characteristics of its employees (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Literature
shows that regardless of the knowledge sources, having adequate knowledge regarding
information security is a prerequisite to performing any normal activity in a secure
manner (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010). Knowledge provides theoretical, strategic,
and practical understanding of the available course of action (Sanchez, 1997).
Thus, instead of focusing on security policies and SETA programs directly,
researchers in information security literature have advocated for focusing on knowledge
dimensions, such as the comprehensiveness of knowledge (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). As a
result, information security research focused mainly on the use of the comprehensiveness
of knowledge without explaining whether that means depth of knowledge, breadth of
knowledge, or creative use of knowledge. Information security literature currently does
not explicitly leverage knowledge dimensions. To address this gap, this study draws
from the knowledge management literature, as it presents a more complete picture of
knowledge dimensions that are not yet explored in information security literature.
Scholars studying knowledge management explained that knowledge is a
multidimensional construct that provides outcomes unique to each of the knowledge
dimensions (Sanchez, 1997). Knowledge dimensions are breadth, depth, and finesse
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(Munro et al., 1997). Knowledge breadth is the variety of knowledge, knowledge depth
represents the completeness of knowledge regarding a specific subject, and finesse is the
ability to apply innovativeness and creativity (Munro et al., 1997). Breadth of
information security knowledge, increases employees’ security awareness and prevents
duplication of efforts saving time and money (Safa et al., 2016). Depth of knowledge is
required to learn how to identify a threat and know the specific steps needed to deal with
that threat (Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015). Finesse embodies creativity, self- sufficiency,
and ability to learn new things (Mills & Chin, 2007). Overall, this research investigates
the embedded knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and finesse) as key factors that
influence employees’ psychological processes and subsequent behavior.
1.3 Psychological Process
All behaviors are driven by the psychological process (Trope et al., 2007).
Researchers have used various behavioral theories in the context of information security
to study compliance behavior. For example, Chatterjee et al. (2015) investigated
employees’ attitude and subjective norms regarding security. They applied the theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Chen et al. (2012) applied the general deterrence theory
to explain the impact of punishment and deterrence mechanisms on security. Liang and
Xue (2009) tested the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) to explain user
rejection of malicious IT artifacts. Several researchers used protection motivation theory
(Rogers, 1975) in the study of employees’ behavioral change and focused on compliance
motivation (Sommestad et al., 2015). The revised version of protection motivation
theory (PMT) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1983) has been noted as one of the
dominant theories for predicting individuals’ intentions to engage in protective actions
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(Ifinedo, 2012). PMT is used extensively to investigate behavior in the context
information security (Boss et al., 2015).
This research draws on the revised version of PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983;
Rogers, 1983) to explain the psychological processes that motivate individuals to engage
in protective behavior when faced with threats. PMT postulates that individuals’
motivation to protect themselves from any threat is a result of the outcome of two
appraisal processes, threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).
Threat appraisal is an individual’s perception of the probability of exposure or
vulnerability to a threat, as well as the perceived severity of the consequences of that
threat (Boss et al., 2015; Ifinedo, 2012). Coping appraisal is the process by which
individuals evaluate the feasibility of the available risk mitigating action or response
efficacy, their own ability to contribute to the recommended protective response or selfefficacy, and the response cost (Posey et al., 2015).
Although PMT has been used in a sizable number of studies in the context of
information security, the key variables’ impact, significance, and directions have shown
great variations and inconsistencies (Posey et al., 2015). Several researchers supported
the positive impact of the severity of threat on compliance motivation as proposed by
PMT (Sommestad et al., 2015). In contrast, other researchers reported a negative impact
of threat severity (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Warkentin, Walden, Johnston, & Straub, 2016)
or found its impact to be insignificant (Ifinedo, 2012). As a result, scholars argue that the
context of application is a potential reason for PMT inconsistent results (Johnston et al.,
2015). Researchers have called for future research to address the inconsistent findings
regarding the impact of each of PMT constructs in the context of information security
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(Warkentin et al., 2016). To address the inconsistencies, this research applied PMT
based on its original intent that requires threats to be on a personal level and not a threat
against the organization.
This research introduces an employee’s psychological distance to security threats
to apply PMT, as originally intended, from a personal level. Psychological distance is a
personal reference regarding an event (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Psychological distance
impacts the way individuals perceive events (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Overall, this
research draws on psychological distance theory to dimensionalize the threat environment
and then investigates how these dimensions impact the psychological process that leads
to end-user behavior. Such an approach enables information security threats to be
personal threats and preserves the original intention of PMT.
1.4 Specific Research Questions
This study understands how the use knowledge dimensions in SETA and security
policies can motivate individuals to comply with the organization’s information security
regulations and procedures. The research answers the following questions:
Q1: What are the key psychological processes that influence employees’ secure
behavior when dealing with an information security threat?
Q2: How do organizational knowledge mechanisms such as SETA programs and
policies influence key psychological processes of threat perception?
The research offers noteworthy contributions to the literature. The research
develops a theoretically grounded model for information security compliance that
addresses current gaps in literature. The study investigates knowledge dimensions in
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SETA programs and security policies as an input to psychological process to construct
personal perceptions regarding specific information security threats. The research
provides greater understanding to the role of knowledge dimensions and employees’
psychological state that motivates compliance. While the existing literature has
successfully expanded our knowledge and understanding regarding factors influencing
information security compliance, the conventional application of PMT in the field of
information security caused inconsistent and conflicting results. This research presents
an approach to limit results variations and allows PMT to work as designed in the context
of information security.
This research provides a generalizable approach for any incident-driven behavior
and a practical business approach to a topic that is typically viewed as a technical
problem. Understanding the unique outcomes to each of the knowledge dimensions
provides strategies regarding the use of organizational knowledge mechanisms in the
context of information security. This work presents an approach to enable practitioners
and scholars to establish the linkage between security needs and job demands with an
approach that enables the organization to influence compliance without hindering
productivity. It highlights the use of SETA programs in the organization to develop more
effective and attainable information security policies and procedures.
1.5 Research Design
This research applied quantitative methods to examine the relationships between
variables to address the research questions. The research empirically tested the model
using two-study approach. The first study was a scenario-based experiment to answer the
first research question regarding key psychological processes of threat perception. The
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experiment was conducted with 262 university students. Participants were provided
various manipulation scenarios that represented different psychological distances. To
achieve this, the researcher manipulated the degree of abstraction or concreteness of
specific threat contexts. Students were asked to fill a behavioral focused questionnaire to
empirically validate the instrument that measures the impact of threat un-desirability and
coping feasibility on protection motivation.
The second study empirically validated the entire theoretical model, including
input, process, and output. This approach was consistent with seminal information
systems literature. Literature supports that instrument validation should precede the
research model empirical validation (Straub, 1989). Data were collected from 219
employees across various organization with varied responsibilities and technical
competences. The theoretical model was tested using structural equation modeling
(SEM) approach. The findings from this study can be used in future quantitative studies
in researching the design and development of training and organizational policies
concerned with employees’ compliance behavior.
1.6 Organization and Overview of the Dissertation Proposal
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Following this introductory chapter,
which presented the topic importance and research motivation, chapter 2 offers a review
of the related literature. In chapter 2, support is drawn from reported empirical results
and findings relevant to the gaps outlined in chapter 1. Chapter 3 presents the research
theoretical model and hypotheses. In this chapter, the research model is presented, the
constructs are explained, and justifications for the hypotheses are provided. Chapter 4
discusses the research design. This chapter establishes the quantitative multi-method
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approaches followed to validate empirically the research model. Chapter 4 explains the
measurements, sample frame, controls, and statistical procedures. Chapter 5 presents the
data analysis. This chapter includes the statistical data analysis, including constructs
validity and reliability. Chapter 5 also includes a comparative analysis and results
comparison between the traditional PMT model and the model presented in this research.
The research discussion is presented in the final chapter, chapter 6. Chapter 6 discusses
the results, interpretation, research limitations, and future research directions.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the behavioral research in the information security literature has focused
on two streams of research: a) compliance behavior and b) training and policy initiatives.
The relevant research findings in both these areas are summarized in this chapter. This
chapter explores the information security literature and points out relevant key findings
and gaps. The review of the relevant literature brings together the major findings to
advance the understanding and to show how this research can address key gaps.
The chapter starts by briefly describing a framework to integrate these research
streams. Next, we draw upon knowledge mechanisms, SETA and security policies, and
PMT to understand existing literature. After having summarized the literature review and
the gaps, the last section presents a case for expanding the existing models of
investigation to address the gaps highlighted. To review the related information security
literature, a broad review of seminal research was performed. This broad review focused
on understanding the impact of employees’ behavior on information security. Then, the
review focused on employees’ behavioral motivation to understand relationships among
factors influencing the main overarching research question. The literature review follows
a chronological order based on the foundation of the knowledge provided by previous
high-impact research through the most recent publications to identify findings and gaps
outlined by the current information security research.
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A holistic and systematic framework to summarize the literature is the inputprocess-outcome framework. Input-process-outcome was proposed by Garris, Ahlers,
and Driskell (2002). In this perspective, the input is instructional content, process is the
development of judgement, and the output is the influenced behavior. This framework
allows us to capture the key influencers towards behavior as well as understand the
process through which such a behavior decision was arrived at (see Figure 1). Input
represents the elements in the environment that influence the target behavior under
investigation, which in this case is secure behavior. Three elements studied in the
literature are a) the threat context, b) SETA programs, and c) organizational policies.
The latter two factors deal with the transfer of knowledge and are mentioned as
knowledge mechanisms in the figure. Process deals with an individual’s cognitive and
affective psychological processes involved in arriving at the behavioral choice. Research
in the information security literature has focused on psychological processes. This
chapter focuses on the same. The outcome represents the behavioral choice that the enduser demonstrates in the face of a threat.
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Figure 1. Literature review organization
Following the explained systematic approach, the review of information security
literature first clarifies the two inputs stemming from the literature: threat context and
knowledge mechanisms. The context of a threat is relevant to the impact on the
individual’s psychological state (Wu et al., 2005). Then the empirical research concerned
with knowledge mechanisms is synthesized to understand its influence on employees’
psychological processes. Finally, the applications of PMT are reviewed in the literature
to explain the psychological processes that motivate employees’ secure behavior in a
business environment. The major findings are organized to assimilate the current state of
the information security literature and to point out the gaps that need to be addressed to
explain how knowledge mechanisms influence employees’ psychological processes and
subsequent behavior.
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2.1 Inputs - Threat Context
Threat context refers to the circumstances that exploit vulnerability caused by
technical, administrative, or physical weaknesses that can cause damage to information
security attributes such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Fenz & Ekelhart,
2009). Table 1 summarizes context of information security threat in the literature.
Threats to information security can be man-made or non-human threats (Loch et al.,
1992), and each threat will have a certain degree of severity (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009).
Table 1: Literature Summary of Findings Regarding Threat Context
Literature
Babar et al. (2010)

Boss et al. (2015)
Chatterjee et al. (2015)
Chen et al. (2012)
D'Arcy et al. (2014)
Friedman and Hoffman (2008)
Ifinedo (2012)
Johnston and Warkentin (2010)
Johnston et al. (2015)
Loch et al. (1992)

Posey et al. (2015)
Siponen et al. (2014)
Vance et al. (2012)
Whitman (2003)

Threats/Implied Threats
Reveal identity, expose authentication, denial
of service, and tampering with organization’s
hardware
Loss of critical data and data corruption
Hacking, phishing, unauthorized personal use
of IT artifacts
Email attachments and suspicious internet sites
Complex and stressful security standards
Malware, phishing, spoofing, loss, and theft of
devices, and user policy violations
Data breaches or the unauthorized access
Spyware defense
Data breach
Natural disasters, unauthorized access, denial
of service, reverse engineering, theft of
equipment, data destruction, computer viruses,
or employee fault
Data corruption
Damaged or stolen computers and laptops
Computer viruses and unauthorized access to
confidential information
Malicious software, system failure, mistakes,
denial of service, natural disasters
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Threats to information exist and are inevitable, whether or not perceived by the
individual (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). The literature suggests that there can be many
types of threats, ranging from man-made or non-human threats (Loch et al., 1992).
Researchers found that the most impactful man-made threats are malicious software,
system failure, and employees errors whether intentional or accidental (Whitman, 2003).
Researchers also addressed non-human security threats such as natural disasters like
earthquakes, floods, wildfires, or hurricanes that can destroy or prevent access to
information systems (Loch et al., 1992).
Threats to the security of information were also classified based on the impact on
business processes. Babar et al. (2010) described three threat categories: identification,
communication, and physical threats. Identification threats are the threats that reveal the
identity and the authentication process for device, user, or session. Denial of service is an
example of a communication threat. The physical threats include theft of equipment,
facility destruction, tampering with organization’s hardware, or product reverse
engineering. Also, studies of information security threats addressed the dilemma of
ethics and the ethical use of IT artifacts. Unauthorized personal use of IT artifacts
influenced by opportunism and personal gain is an example of a threat to the security of
information systems caused by the unethical use of information systems (Chatterjee et al.,
2015). Finally, information security research has identified sixty-seven unique
protection-motivated behaviors for employees to follow in the organization (Posey,
Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013).
This extensive focus on threat context has resulted in researchers focusing on
compliance behavior, e.g., better management of passwords (Chen et al., 2012; Ifinedo,
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2012; Johnston et al., 2015), use of an encrypted USB drive, or locked workstations
(Johnston et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015) to prevent data breaches. Such research,
however, does not focus on the process through which an end user understands and deals
with the threat. The operation of a threat has been often inferred from its effects rather
than the direct assessment of the threat itself (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,
1999). As a result, the research provided sixty-seven different behavioral solutions
influenced by information security threat effects (Posey et al., 2013) resulting in threat
interpretational difficulties (Branscombe et al., 1999). Threats to the security of the
information are distinct and require specific assessments and behavior judgments by the
end-user (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008).
In this research, instead of focusing on specific threat types, the focus is on how
any threat is perceived by the end-user. This allows the research to be generalizable
across different threat contexts. Furthermore, it provides additional relevance for the
study because threats continue to evolve over time (Whitman, 2003).
2.2 Inputs - Knowledge Mechanisms: Policies and SETA
Extant literature suggests that comprehensive security controls in the organization
rely on security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs (Whitman, 2003),
as well as policies that provide series of guidelines and procedures relating to the
prevention, detection, and correction cycle of information security management (Chen et
al., 2015).
Researchers described information security policies as important technical
oriented documents implemented in the organization to proactively safeguard corporate
information resources and reduce security breaches (Doherty et al., 2009; Ifinedo, 2012).
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Information security policies were applied to communicate general rules regarding
compliance requirements (Knapp et al., 2009) and to identify information risk
management process in order to assess awareness pertaining to information protection
(Da Veiga & Martins, 2015). Policies safeguard against information abuse, destruction
and misuse (Safa et al., 2016). They were described as a useful mechanism for shaping
or influencing employees’ behaviors with respect to the use of organizational resources
(Ifinedo, 2012). Researchers identified security policies as internal regulation and law
intended to modify employees’ behaviors toward information security (Chen et al., 2015;
Vance et al., 2013) through the communication of compliance requirements and
employees’ responsibilities to protect organizational information and technology
resources (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Tsohou et al., 2015).
Researchers explained that SETA programs are procedural mechanisms
implemented in the organization to manifest information security policy requirements
(Da Veiga & Martins, 2015) so that information security becomes a natural inherent
aspect in employees’ daily jobs (Chen et al., 2015). The three elements of SETA are
education, training, and awareness (Posey et al., 2015; Whitman, 2008). SETA programs
were applied to communicate goals, expectations, and procedures designed for employees
to encourage their information security compliance behavior (Johnston et al., 2015).
Literature proposed the use of SETA as a strategy to promote information security
compliance and minimize accidental security breaches (Warkentin et al., 2016). SETA
programs were used to aid individuals to form the desired security perception (Tsohou et
al., 2015). Researchers have suggested that SETA programs could complement policies
and develop awareness of safe and ethical use (Chatterjee et al., 2015). Trained
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employees were found to be more positive regarding security requirements than untrained
employees (Da Veiga & Martins, 2015). Table 2 below summarizes literature
suggestions regarding information security policies and SETA programs.
Table 2: Literature Summary of Findings Regarding Policies and SETA
Research

Security Policies

SETA Programs

Findings

Bulgurcu et al.
(2010)

Define rules and
employees’
responsibilities to
safeguard
information

Highlight
compliance drivers
and simplify policy
requirements

Policies and SETA
have a positive
impact, mediated
by beliefs, on
security attitude
toward
compliance

Chatterjee et al.
(2015)

Defines acceptable
use of IT artifacts

Provide moral
education and
awareness of safe
and ethical use

Results imply the
negative impact of
Policies and SETA
on intentions for
unethical use of IT
artifacts

Chen et al. (2015)

Internal vision,
regulations, and law
regarding the security
of organizational
information

Mechanisms to
ensure employees'
awareness of
information
security policies

Results support the
positive impact of
SETA on policy
awareness.

D'Arcy, Hovav,
Define rules and
and Galletta (2009) guidelines for the
proper use of
organizational
information systems

SETA programs
provide knowledge
to ensure the
success of security
policies

Policies and SETA
programs deter
intentions of
information
systems misuse

Da Veiga and
Martins (2015)

Manifest
information
security policy
requirements

Results support
that security
training improves
information
protection

Sets security
regulatory
requirements
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Doherty et al.
(2009)

Business document
Without SETA
placed to proactively security policies
safeguard the
are dead
availability,
confidentiality and
integrity of corporate
information resources

Breadth of the
existing policies is
modest and highly
techno-centric

Ifinedo (2012)

Organizational
document that
outlines rules,
guidelines, and
requirements that
must be met to
safeguard IS assets

Can increase policy Researcher
compliance
Suggests that
SETA can have a
positive impact on
compliance

Johnston et al.
(2015)

Recommended
secure behavior

Articulate and
communicate
security goals and
expectations

Results imply the
positive effect of
SETA on policy
compliance

Knapp et al. (2009) The single most
Promote favorable
important control to
security practices
protect valuable
information First step
towards the
protection of valuable
information

Policies are
ineffective without
enforcement and
SETA promote
secure practice

Posey et al. (2015)

Organizational rules
and regulations for
organizational
security

Provide the
foundation for the
appraisals of
threats and
available responses

SETA programs
have a significant
positive impact on
response efficacy

Safa et al. (2016)

Address information
risks and safeguard
against information
abuse, destruction,
and misuse

Intervention
strategy for
information
security

Training has a
positive effect on
attitudes toward
compliance

Tsohou et al.
(2015)

Define what is
expected of
individuals

Aim to produce
certain security
skills and
competencies

SETA programs
promote security
compliance
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Vance et al. (2013)

Internal regulation to
control access to
information

Training can
prevent policy
violations and
bring awareness to
policy
requirements

Awareness has a
negative impact on
intentions to
commit access
violation

Warkentin et al.
(2016)

Persuasive
communication
through fear appeals
to motivate
compliance

Support and
reinforce security
policies

Results imply that
SETA programs
are effective in
encouraging
protective behavior

Overall, the research in this area shows that training and organizational policy
mechanisms have a positive impact, highlighting the importance of these two
mechanisms (Chen et al., 2015). An additional conclusion that can be derived from the
above table is that the both policy and training have a similar impact. Both serve as
knowledge transfer mechanisms (Da Veiga & Martins, 2015). Researchers have
generally treated training and policy-based models as an input-output model, thus
ignoring the critical role of process (Tsohou et al., 2015). Transforming security
behavior goes beyond the communication and acquisition of knowledge and awareness of
threats and security (Johnston et al., 2015). Researchers have argued that in order for
knowledge mechanisms to succeed, there is a need to have a deeper understanding of the
individuals’ process of information that stimulates behavioral change (Warkentin et al.,
2016). An understanding of the influence that training and policy have on key process
constructs will help trainers and researchers better design training and write policies.
Additionally, as can be seen from Table 2, there is great variation in policies and training
across research and organizational contexts. Also, each individual might interpret these
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mechanisms differently. This has resulted in variations in impact (D'Arcy et al., 2009;
Warkentin et al., 2016). This results in a lack of generalizability of the results.
In this research, instead of focusing on the effectiveness of specific policy and
training, the focus is on the knowledge dimensions that these mechanisms embed.
Information security researchers have addressed the comprehensiveness as the only
dimension (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). However, knowledge management perspectives see
knowledge as a multidimensional construct (Sanchez, 1997). The three independent
dimensions of knowledge that shape employees’ abilities are breadth, depth, and finesse
(Munro, Huff, Marcolin, & Compeau, 1997). Knowledge breadth is the horizontal
dimension that captures the understanding of a varied and diverse range of information
and factors (Luca & Atuahene-Gima, 2007). Knowledge depth represents the
completeness of the user's knowledge that leads to mastery of a particular subject or task
while finesse is the ability to apply innovativeness and creativity (Munro et al., 1997).
These three dimensions have been studied in the knowledge management literature and
help explain comprehensiveness better. These dimensions exist across all trainings and
policies (although in different levels) and thus, they provide the ability to account for
variance across policies and training. The application of knowledge across these three
dimensions also helps in providing guidelines that are more specific to practitioners.
2.3 Process - Psychological Process
PMT has become a dominant theoretical foundation used to investigate behavior
in information security (Boss et al., 2015; Crossler et al., 2013; Herath & Rao, 2009b).
PMT argues that intentions are motivated by individuals’ assessment of threats based on
two cognitive processes, the threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Johnston &
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Warkentin, 2010) and is thus used to summarize this section. PMT was originally
developed for disease prevention and health promotion (Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers,
2000). The theory was developed to explain the effects of fear appeals on health attitudes
and protective behavior (Rogers, 1975). The theory was revised, Figure 2, to include a
broader range of factors and became a general model of attitude change (Maddux &
Rogers, 1983; Norman, Boer, & Seydel, 2005; Rogers, 1983). As indicated in the
previous chapter, this research drew on the revised version of PMT (Maddux & Rogers,
1983; Rogers, 1983). In this section, PMT was used to organize existing literature,
pointing out some major findings and gaps.

Figure 2. Diagram of the modified protection motivation theory
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2.4 Threat Appraisal
Threat appraisal is the individual’s assessment of the probability of exposure or
vulnerability and the assessment of the severity of that threat (Ifinedo, 2012). Table 3
summarizes research findings regarding the application of threat appraisal constructs and
the impact on employees’ behavioral intentions. The table shows threat appraisal
constructs that were tested and the constructs that were not included in the summarized
literature. The table also shows whether the tested threat appraisal constructs reflected
positive, negative, or insignificant impacts on compliance intentions. Each component is
discussed next.
Table 3: Literature Summary of Findings Regarding Threat Appraisal Impact on
Behavioral Intentions
Threat

Threat

Severity

Vulnerability

Literature

Context

Boss et al.
(2015)

Positive impact
when perceived on
a personal level

Positive impact
when applied only
on personal level

Systems and information
backup and the use of antimalware software

Bulgurcu et
al. (2010)

Positive impact

Positive impact

Organizational information
security policy compliance

Chen et al.
(2012)

Positive impact

Not included

Password management,
email attachments, and
suspicious internet sites

Herath and
When
Rao (2009a) conceptualized
through severity of
punishment had a
negative impact on
compliance

Not included

Detection of employees’
policy violations

Herath and
Positive impact
Rao (2009b)

Not supported

Security breach that leads
to denial of service and
loss of data
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Ifinedo
(2012)

Not supported

Positive impact

Information access control,
downloading illegal
software and freeware

Johnston
and
Warkentin
(2010)

Positive impact

Not supported

Spyware defense

Johnston et
al. (2015)

Positive impact
when applied only
on personal level

Positive impact
when applied only
on personal level

Theft of password, login
information, or
unencrypted USB drive

D. Lee,
Larose, and
Rifon
(2008)

Not Supported

Positive impact

Antivirus protection

Y. Lee and
Larsen
(2009)

Positive impact

Positive impact
however, relatively
weaker than
expected

The adoption of
antimalware software

Posey et al.
(2015)

Positive impact
when applied only
on personal level

Not Supported

Protection from
unauthorized login,
protecting stored data,
appropriate use of email
and Internet, software
updates

Siponen et
al. (2014)

Positive impact

Positive impact

Locking office doors,
turning off PCs at the end
of the day, and password
protection

Vance et al.
(2012)

Positive impact

Not supported

Sharing passwords, failing
to lock or log off a
workstation, allowing
reading confidential
material at printers

Warkentin
et al. (2016)

Positive impact

Positive impact
when applied only
on a personal level
and organization
vulnerability was
not supported

Use of encryption to
protect data, careful when
opening attachment,
perform security updates,
perform antivirus scans
frequently, change
password frequently, lock
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the computer, back up
regularly

Threat severity is an individual’s perception regarding the level or the degree of
the damaging impact of the threat (Sommestad et al., 2015). In the context of
information security policy compliance, it refers to the evaluation of the severity of the
damage and the possible negative events resulting from noncompliance with the
recommended information security policies (Vance et al., 2012). The behavior of
individuals is influenced by their appraisal of the damaging impact of a threat and its
unwarranted consequences (Sommestad et al., 2015). The overall assessment of severity
of the threat is conceptualized to exert significant positive influence on an employee’s
attitude toward compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen et al., 2014). However,
researchers have also found a limited or even negative impact of threat severity on
compliance intention in certain contexts. For example, Herath and Rao (2009a)
conceptualized threat severity by the increased deterrent effect of severity of punishment.
They found that severity of punishment had a negative effect on compliance intentions.
To explain the results, they argued that the excessive use of punishment would create
hostile, stressful, and disruptive work environment. Warkentin et al. (2016) also
supported that threat severity negatively impacts compliance intentions and argued that
the exposure to too much fear would generate stress, resulting in a behavior that is
oriented towards alleviating that fear rather than dealing with the threat itself. Other
researchers have addressed the importance of the context of application on perception
arguing that the threat severity will have a positive impact on compliance intentions only
in a personal context (Boss et al., 2015).
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Threat vulnerability is the extent of being susceptible to damage caused by
information security risks (Anderson et al., 2016). The persuasive communication of the
person’s vulnerability to the threat is used to deliver fear that will motivate individuals to
comply with the recommended protective response (Boss et al., 2015). Researchers
found vulnerability to security threats to have a significant impact on behavioral
intentions toward compliance (Johnston et al., 2015). Researchers also conducted
experimental research that produced results which show that in order for threat
vulnerability to positively influence compliance behavior, the vulnerability must be on a
personal level and not toward the organization (Warkentin et al., 2016).
However, other researchers reported conflicting results regarding the impact of
vulnerability on behavioral intentions. Researchers found threat vulnerability to have an
insignificant impact on protection motivation (Posey et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2012).
These results are inconsistent with PMT. Researchers explained that individuals often
believe that they are invulnerable to threats, and others are more vulnerable to threats
than themselves with the naïve perception that bad things happen to other people
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) or because they are overconfident and feel protected by
the organizational systems (Y. Lee & Larsen, 2009). Literature also shows vulnerability
had an insignificant impact on attitude towards compliance; however, the threat was
contextualized on the organizational level instead of the individual level (Herath & Rao,
2009b).
Overall, a review of threat appraisal research in information security behavior has
found considerable variance in results. Researchers have suggested this is primarily due
to the context of the studies and have called for greater contextualization of the theory
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itself (Johnston et al., 2015). Additionally, the second order nature of threat appraisal has
never really been questioned. These constructs originally came from an economic
process model and were then applied to a variance model. This created issues regarding
consistency, reliability and accuracy of measures. As a result, researchers keep adding
new constructs like commitment and maladaptive rewards to increase results consistency.
In this research, we suggest that threat appraisal should be re-conceptualized by
grounding it in the context. This new construct allows researchers to better measure it as
a psychological variable and more clearly explain the underlying psychological process.
2.5 Coping Appraisal
The coping appraisal is the process by which individuals evaluate how effective,
manageable, and feasible the available risk mitigating response can be (Ifinedo, 2012).
The components of coping appraisal are self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response
cost (Boss et al., 2015). Table 4 summarizes the research findings regarding the
application of coping appraisal constructs. The table shows which coping appraisal
constructs were tested and which constructs were not included in the summarized
literature. The table also shows whether the tested coping appraisal constructs reflected
positive, negative, or insignificant impacts on compliance intentions. Each component is
discussed next.
Table 4: Literature Summary of Findings Regarding the Use of Coping Appraisal
Response
Literature

Response
Self-efficacy

Efficacy
Boss et al.
(2015)

Study 1 – No
impact

Context
Cost

Study 1 – No
impact

Negative
impact

Systems and
Information Backup
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Study 2 Positive
impact

Study 2 Positive impact

and the use of antimalware software

Bulgurcu et
al. (2010)

Not included

Positive impact

Negative
impact

Organizational
information security
policy compliance

Chatterjee
et al.
(2015)

Not included

Negative
impact

Negative
impact

Unauthorized access or
software download

Ifinedo
(2012)

Positive
impact

Positive impact

Not
supported

Information access
control, downloading
illegal software and
freeware

Johnston
and
Warkentin
(2010)

Positive
impact

Positive impact

Not
included

Use of anti-spyware

Johnston et
al. (2015)

Positive
impact

Positive impact

Not
included

Change to complex
password, encryption
of USB drive loss and
logging off or locking
workstations

D. Lee et
al. (2008)

Positive
impact

Positive impact

Not
included

The use of virus
protection to protect
online activities from
virus infection

Y. Lee and
Larsen
(2009)

Positive
impact

Positive impact

Negative
impact

The adoption of
antimalware software

Posey et al.
(2015)

Positive
impact

Not supported

Negative
impact

Protection from
unauthorized login,
protecting stored data,
appropriate use of
email and Internet,
software updates
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Siponen et
al. (2014)

Positive
impact

Positive impact

Negative
impact

Locking office doors,
turning off PCs at the
end of the day

Warkentin
et al.
(2016)

Positive
impact

Positive impact

Negative
impact

Use of encryption to
protect data, careful
when opening
attachment, perform
security updates,
perform antivirus scans
frequently, change
password frequently,
lock the computer,
back up regularly

Response efficacy is the belief that the available mitigating response will work
and can successfully diminish the threat (Floyd et al., 2000). Witte (1992) explains that
efficacy exists as an environmental or message cue, which refers to the effectiveness of
the recommended response. The perceived response efficacy refers to an individual's
beliefs as to whether a defined action effectively mitigate the threat. Information security
literature reflects the positive impact of response efficacy on compliance intentions.
Researchers continue to debate the influence of response efficacy. Some researchers
found that industry type plays a significant role to determine the degree of its impact (D.
Lee et al., 2008) or reported different results based on the context of the threat (Boss et
al., 2015). Others reported results consistent with PMT propositions (Johnston et al.,
2015; Siponen et al., 2014). Researchers also argued factors that would impact the
significance of response efficacy. Ifinedo (2012) argued that response efficacy was
enabled by employees’ relevant knowledge, competence, and capability to implement
preventative security measures. Warkentin et al. (2016) recommended that response
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efficacy is more appealing when the mitigating task relative to personal goals and aligned
with individuals’ abilities.
Self-efficacy is the degree to which individuals believe in their own abilities to
perform what is required to avert the threat (Floyd et al., 2000). Researchers have argued
that self-efficacy is the single biggest predictor of behavioral change in individuals
(Bandura, 1977). Information security literature supports the significant positive impact
of self-efficacy on compliance intentions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Ifinedo, 2012).
Warkentin et al. (2016) argued that self-efficacy had the strongest positive impact to
influence compliance intentions. However, other researchers argued factors that can
weaken or even diminish the impact of self-efficacy on compliance. For example,
D'Arcy et al. (2014) argued that the increased complexity of security policy requirement
would have a negative impact on self-efficacy. Other researchers could not even validate
the impact of self-efficacy on compliance intentions (Posey et al., 2015). On the contrast
to prior findings, Chatterjee et al. (2015) suggested that self-efficacy is negatively
associated with ethical use because it enables employees to manipulate technology
maliciously.
Response cost is mainly the extra time and efforts needed to mitigate the risk
(Ifinedo, 2012; Sommestad et al., 2015). The literature generally agreed on the
significant negative impact of response cost on compliance (Boss et al., 2015; Herath &
Rao, 2009b). However, Ifinedo (2012) and D. Lee et al. (2008) found no support for the
impact of response cost on compliance. More researchers focused on different factors
that can impact the evaluation of response cost. D'Arcy et al. (2014) confirmed that the
increased security demands would increase the cost of compliance. Other researchers
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asserted that cost of compliance is calculated as lack of productivity (Bulgurcu et al.,
2010; Posey et al., 2015). Existing literature has also showed that not only time and
efforts impact cost of compliance, but also the loss of business opportunities will cause
response cost to be perceived significantly higher (Posey et al., 2015; Siponen & Iivari,
2006). Our reading of the literature shows that when the response cost is measured at an
individual level, the results are positive.
Overall, the extant research shows significant variance in the impact of cost
appraisal factors on protection motivation. Additionally, researchers have defined
components of cost appraisal differently (D'Arcy et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2015), which
leads to construct validity issues. Finally, response efficacy and self-efficacy have been
defined at the task level, rather than at the threat level. This is inconsistent because a user
might have multiple means of mitigating the threat (S. Gupta et al., 2010).
In this study, we re-conceptualized the intent of coping by focusing on the
individual’s perception of the task to be performed. This study removed all components
that are task-irrelevant and focused on the perception of the effort required for the coping
mechanism. Similar to threat appraisal reconceptualization, this also helps move the
construct from an economic model brought to behavioral research to a psychological
construct in behavioral research.
2.6 Outcome - Behavioral Intentions
The primary focus of PMT is to predict behavior. It contends that protection
motivation is the primary driver of such behavior (Boss et al., 2015; Maddux & Rogers,
1983). Protection motivation reflects the individual’s intentions to engage in protective
behavior (Johnston et al., 2015). Much of the focus of existing research has been on
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compliance behavior (See table 3-4). Compliance behavior or conformation to
established rules and standards assumes that well defined ways of handling known
threats. This might not be true. Additionally, it focuses on a perceived (and prescribed)
solution rather than on mitigating the threat. Studying behaviors as isolated events can
inhibit researchers’ understanding of the complex psychological processes surrounding
the overall superset of human behaviors (Posey et al., 2013). In this research, the focus is
on secure behavior instead of compliance. We conceptualized secure behavior as being a
superset of compliance behavior, also encompassing actions that a user might see fit in
case of threat.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In sum, this chapter presented a literature review of extant literature in
information security training and behavior. The review showed the variance in training
and policies between studies. This highlighted the need to have an overarching
framework to understand and compare different types of training / policy from a user’s
perspective. The review also highlighted the inconsistent results regarding threat
appraisal and coping appraisal. Additionally, the review also highlighted the fact that
different components of PMT were conceptualized at different levels, i.e., task, context,
and individual. All of this emphasized the need to re-conceptualize the psychosocial
process.
The next chapter presents a model addressing these concerns. The model uses an
established multi-dimensional view of the knowledge mechanisms (training/policy). This
allows the researchers to examine distinctly each dimension and its impact. Next, the
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psychological processes that drive behavior are conceptualized at the threat level, which
provides a consistent framework across the study.

CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter presents the research model for this study. It builds on the findings
and the gaps identified in the previous chapter, and outlines how the identified gaps were
addressed in the model. An overview of the research model is presented first. Next, the
various constructs of the model are discussed. Theoretical arguments and testable
hypothesis are presented for each causal link. Appropriate research is cited where
necessary. The chapter ends with an overview of the research method proposed to test
the model.
3.1 Research Model
The overarching question for this research is concerned with understanding the
way knowledge mechanisms can influence employees’ secure behavior in a particular
threat context. The research model presented, shown in Figure 3, builds on the inputprocess-output framework outlined in the earlier chapter. Threat context represents the
events or conditions that expose information systems to potential threats. The model
conceptualized training and policy (knowledge mechanism) across three dimensions:
breadth, depth, and finesse. The psychological process preserved the intent of protection
motivation theory (PMT) while re-conceptualizing the constructs based on the threat undesirability and coping feasibility. Threat un-desirability is the perception of the degree
to which an individual will personally be affected by the threat. Coping feasibility is the
evaluation of ease or difficulty in implementing a threat mitigating action. The model
followed PMT premise where the protection motivation is influenced by the perception of
threat and the available coping mechanisms. Protection motivation refers to the desire
38
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and willingness that directs activities (Floyd et al., 2000). The model also shows that
protection motivation is a predictor of secure behavior.

Figure 3. Research conceptual model
3.2 Threat Context
Threat context is the circumstances faced by end-users that can expose or take
advantage of the technical, administrative, or physical conditions to threaten the security
information confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009). Previous
researchers have either focused on an implicit threat; thus, focusing on a specific solution
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Posey et al., 2013) or researchers have focused on an objective
threat limiting the research generalizability (Chatterjee et al., 2015). The consideration of
threat context determines how any threat is perceived by the end-user. This allows the
research to be generalizable across different known threats, as well as applicable to new
threats that may emerge in the future.
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This research proposes that the threat is activated through perceptions in attitude.
Thus, consistent with protection motivation theory, the present research argues, in a
behavioral model, that threats are manifested as artifacts of attitudes. Consequently, the
proposed model is threat agnostic, i.e., the threat is generalizable across all objective
threats. This research argues that it is not the objective threat, but the perception of threat
by the end user, that drives the behavior. Thus, threat context is the basis of all other
constructs in the model.
3.3 Knowledge Mechanism Dimensions
Knowledge is available to the organization as policies and training (Safa et al.,
2016). Sanchez (1997) explained that knowledge is a multifaceted concept that provides
a theoretical, strategic, and practical understanding of the available course of action.
Such understanding clarifies how to perform an action, why an action provides certain
results, and what the purpose of available course of action. Sanchez also suggested that
each facet of knowledge has specific purposes, requires distinct communication
strategies, and may impact behavior differently. Organizations aim to motivate
employees with knowledge to maintain the state where security behavior is a natural
behavior (Padayachee, 2012). Knowledge mechanisms convey the latest security
knowledge and technical skills (D'Arcy et al., 2014). As discussed in the previous
chapter, the three independent dimensions of knowledge that impact employees’ abilities
to perform a task are breadth, depth, and finesse (Munro et al., 1997).
Information security literature addressed the positive impact of the
comprehensiveness of knowledge mechanism on employees’ behaviors and suggested
approaches to structure the contents of information security policy (Siponen & Iivari,
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2006) and to provide effective information security training (Karjalainen & Siponen,
2011). These approaches focused on employees’ cognitive process (Bulgurcu et al.,
2010) to comprehend and learn about information security. The aim is to enable every
organization to motivate employees to a point where security behavior is a natural
behavior (Padayachee, 2012). Researchers have focused on understanding how
individuals assess a topic of interest cognitively (Posey et al., 2013). However,
transforming security behavior goes beyond the communication and acquisition of
knowledge and awareness of threats and security (Johnston et al., 2015). Researchers
advocated the need to address the gap between employees’ knowledge and behaviors or
the “knowing-doing” gap (Burns et al., 2017). Thus, we argue that despite the
importance of cognition, behavioral drivers are affective. This research clarifies the
psychological impact of knowledge mechanisms across three dimensions: breadth, depth,
and finesse.
3.3.1 Breadth
Knowledge breadth refers to the different knowledge across domains with which
the firm is familiar (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996). The breadth of knowledge is related to
a broader set of tasks rather than steps of technical job requirements (Burns et al., 2017).
Breadth is the horizontal dimension of knowledge (De Luca & Atuahene-Gima, 2013).
In the context of information security SETA and policies, knowledge breadth can be
defined as the organizational broad understanding of wide range of diverse information
security threats. Information security require the coverage of wide range of
organizational functions (Ashenden, 2008).
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Protecting organizational information assets requires knowledge of wide range of
threats and the corresponding mitigating actions (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). A policy
articulates knowledge regarding general organizational rules and regulations to direct the
behavior of subordinates (Knapp et al., 2009). Further, training is the most pervasive
method for communicating organizations’ goals (S. Gupta et al., 2010). Researchers
explained that policies can be designed to reflect a broad set of risks to organizational
processes (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002) and training can provide information security
knowledge that leads to comprehension and familiarity to manage security incidents
(Safa et al., 2016). Training has a significant impact on employees’ attitude change (S.
Gupta et al., 2010). Knowledge mechanisms can capture wide range of security
requirements (Siponen, Baskerville, & Heikka, 2006) that leads to comprehension and
familiarity (Safa et al., 2016) and increase awareness (D'Arcy et al., 2009) of security
incidents and risks to information. Training goals have skill-based goals for breadth of
knowledge (S. Gupta et al., 2010). Training provides theoretical principles that explain
how and why training works and practical guidance for implementation (Puhakainen &
Siponen, 2010). Knowledge mechanisms are used to aid individuals to form the desired
security perception (Tsohou et al., 2015).
In contrast, the limited breadth of knowledge in training and policy reduces the
end user’s abilities to recognize threats as well as understand their impact. Researchers
suggested that employees generally do not believe that their insecure behavior can make
them subjected to information security threats (Vance et al., 2012). A lack of knowledge
can cause accidental security breaches and can also increase security threats (Warkentin
et al., 2016)
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Knowledge breadth can increase employees’ ability to distinguish between
threats. Breadth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms can associate employees’ daily
assignments with various threat contexts or the circumstances that can exploit systems’
vulnerabilities and threaten the security of information. Knowledge breadth helps form
adequate evaluation and understanding regarding threats’ impact (Posey et al., 2015).
This study argues that the breadth of knowledge can explain risks associated with wide
range of security threats that users otherwise may think irrelevant to their daily
responsibilities. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: The greater the breadth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the greater
the un-desirability of threat by end-users.
3.3.2 Depth
Knowledge depth is the completeness of knowledge regarding a task that leads to
the competency of performance (Munro et al., 1997). Depth captures the vertical
dimension of knowledge (De Luca & Atuahene-Gima, 2013). Knowledge depth is
needed to address the complexity of knowledge across functional units (Galunic &
Rodan, 1998). Depth provides knowledge about the capabilities of a technology
(Nambisan, Agarwal, & Tanniru, 1999) and the strategic understanding of the purpose of
the available course of action (Sanchez, 1997). In the context of information security,
knowledge depth in knowledge mechanisms provide understanding of the complete steps
needed to address any threat in a specific context. It can enable efficient and effective
approach to safeguard information assets (Safa et al., 2016).
Literature shows that employees develop the desired attitude if they have the
relevant expertise to implement the recommended security measures (Ifinedo, 2012). In
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order for employees to know how to perform any activity in a secure manner, employees
would have to have sufficient knowledge to perform their tasks securely (Van Niekerk &
Von Solms, 2010). Researchers suggested that information security knowledge prevents
duplication of efforts, thus saving time and money (Safa et al., 2016). Literature shows
that people mistakenly estimated more time on task when they had abstract knowledge
which reduced task feasibility (Kanten, 2011). Having an in-depth understanding about
the available course of action will increase coping feasibility.
Inadequate depth of information security knowledge is the leading cause of
information security incidents created by employees (Safa et al., 2016). Abstractness
about an event has a detrimental effect on accuracy (Halamish, Borovoi, & Liberman,
2017) which will increase the cost of the coping mechanism. Complex security standards
can be perceived as counterproductive (Herath & Rao, 2009b). Lack of depth in
knowledge mechanisms may lead employees to believe that all outcomes are
predetermined and therefore, the threat impact is inevitable (Workman et al., 2008).
Also, a lack of depth of knowledge may contribute to the perception of the conflict
between business opportunities and security demands (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).
Researchers concluded that violations are justified by the perception of counterproductive
security measures (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2015). Lack of knowledge depth
may cause performance delay that increases the cost of response and employees will be
reluctant to comply (Anderson et al., 2016) and encourage employees to rationalize
violations (Siponen & Vance, 2010).
Researchers expressed that not only is it important for employees to be aware of
security measures, but also they need to be able to successfully carry out these tasks

45
(Padayachee, 2012). Employees need to maintain their productivity for security
requirements to be feasible (Posey et al., 2015; Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Knowledge
depth can allow employees to perform their daily assignment while in compliance with
the organization's security requirements (Chen et al., 2015). The knowledge about
feasible responses can have a positive impact on secure behavior (Warkentin et al., 2016).
Security measures need to be perceived as viable to be followed (Padayachee, 2012).
Therefore, this study argued that knowledge depth provides feasible approach to apply
the available security recommendations. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H2: The greater the depth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the higher the
coping feasibility.
3.3.3 Finesse
Finesse is the ability to apply innovativeness to the available course of action
(Munro et al., 1997). Finesse provides great operational value from insights and
intuitions (B. Gupta, Iyer, & Aronson, 2000). This knowledge dimension embodies
creativity, self-sufficiency, and the ability to learn new things (Mills & Chin, 2007). In
the context of information security, finesse is the ability to follow creative approaches to
mitigate a threat in a specific context. Finesse allows the mining of employees’ insights
and intuitions (B. Gupta et al., 2000). Employees can be more motivated to adopt
security practices if they have the skills and the experience (Padayachee, 2012).
Finesse is a dimension of knowledge that has not been considered in the context
of information security. However, Studies have shown that having an innovative creative
style is positively correlated with IT use (Gallivan, 2003). Knowledge can be transferred
through frequent advice from experts (Galunic & Rodan, 1998) or employees’
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collaboration (Safa et al., 2016). Knowledge is personalized information possessed in the
mind of individuals (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). Therefore, finesse allows employees to
collaborate and brainstorm to create feasible approaches to required tasks. This is
consistent with Nonaka, Byosiere, Borucki, and Konno (1994), that such approach
improves competence and enhances performance. Thus, we argue that finesse enables
employees to increase the feasibility of security measures. Hence, the following
hypothesis is proposed:
H3: The greater the finesse, the higher the coping feasibility.
3.4 Psychological Process
Much of existing literature has focused on two psychological constructs – threat
appraisal and coping appraisal. However, as shown in chapter 2, the results from
empirical studies have been inconsistent. A key reason for this is the lack of
personalization of the theory. The premise of PMT is to motivate individuals to protect
themselves from a specific personal threat (Floyd et al., 2000; Rogers, 1983). The
personal motivation is influenced by the perception of the presence of an effective
response that individuals can perform to protect themselves from that threat (Floyd et al.,
2000). However, threats toward the organization instead of the person did not present
accurately the intent of PMT, and as a result, this approach did not motivate individuals
with consistency (Warkentin et al., 2016). The analysis of prior research using PMT in
information security context has confirmed varied and conflicting results for reasons
other than natural variation or measurement error, suggesting that the conflicting results
were due to the context of the application (Sommestad et al., 2015). Researchers called
for future research to address the inconsistent findings regarding the impact of each of
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PMT constructs in the context of information security (Warkentin et al., 2016). In order
for PMT to create the desired protection motivation, the threat must be more concrete and
related to the person and not to the person’s organization (Sommestad et al., 2015).
Including the dimension of personal relevance is critical to preserve the original premise
of PMT. Therefore, the literature presents a need for a theoretically driven reconceptualization of PMT constructs to preserve its intent in the context of information
security.
3.4.1 Construal Level Theory
Construal level theory (CLT) (Trope & Liberman, 2010) will be introduced in this
section to provide means to measure the psychological constructs of PMT from an
individual’s perspective, i.e., personalizing them. CLT is appropriate to bring the
original intent of PMT constructs to the context of information security to minimize
results inconsistency regarding PMT constructs. CLT explains the way individuals
construct perception and the associated behavior regarding any particular event (Ho et al.,
2015; (Köhler, Breugelmans, & Dellaert, 2011). The key concept behind the theory is the
idea of “Construal”. The psychological term “construal” refers to the individuals’
interpretation and perception of an event (construed by individuals) (Trope et al., 2007)
to come up with a behavior choice.
Individuals use construal process to construct egocentric reference point, called
psychological distance, to all objects and events (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
Psychological distance is egocentric; its reference point is the self in the here and now,
and the different ways in which an object might be removed from that point constitute
different distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Psychological distance impacts the way
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individuals perceive or construe the event (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Events are
construed with a higher level of abstraction as the psychological distance increases
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). By contrast, the decreased psychological distance between
the individual and the event leads to lower level of construal that creates more detailed,
concrete, and context-specific interpretation of the event (Trope et al., 2007). CLT
explains that the closer the psychological distance between individuals and an event, the
more concrete the event will be construed. On the other hand, as the psychological
distance increases, the more abstract the event will become (Krishna, 2012; Trope et al.,
2007).
CLT posits that psychological distance has several dimensions (Trope et al.,
2007): temporal (Liberman & Trope, 1998), spatial (Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, &
Liberman, 2008), social (Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008), and hypothetical
(Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). All four types of distance produced
significant effects on construal level, supporting the central proposition of CLT that
variation along any dimension of psychological distance will influence construal level,
which means the degree of interpretation’s abstraction (Soderberg, Callahan,
Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2015).
The temporal dimension is a time relevant dimension that explains the
psychological distance for an event that is happening now compared to an event that will
happen in the future (Liberman & Trope, 1998). A spatial dimension is a place relevant
dimension that explains the psychological distance for an event that will take place here
compared to an event that will take place somewhere else (Fujita et al., 2008). The social
dimension is a people relevant dimension that explains the psychological distance for an
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event that will impact the person’s own-self compared to an event that will impact others
(Liviatan et al., 2008). The hypothetical dimension is a probability relevant dimension
that explains the psychological distance for an event that is more likely to happen
compared to an event with remote possibilities of happening (Wakslak et al., 2006). The
probability of an event’s occurrence not only impacts the individual’s perception
regarding the event, but it also can have significant implications on the decision and the
course of actions regarding this event (Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007). Dimensions
such as time, place, people, and the probability of occurrence influence the psychological
process of event interpretation. Therefore, according to CLT, an event will be at a greater
psychological distance when it is farther into the future, occurs in remote locations, less
likely to occur, or affects other people (Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007).
CTL explained that the detailed and physical presentation of the actual product, as
opposed to being represented abstractly by a verbal brand name, directed consumers to
have accurate judgment of the product (Krishna, 2012). Increased psychological distance
increased the desirability perception of the system’s ease of use and usefulness and
increased adoption intention (Ho et al., 2015). When CLT was applied to evaluate
customers’ online reviews, results reflected that the increased distance and abstraction
created more positive perception of the event and positive feedback (Huang, Burtch,
Hong, & Polman, 2016). In a CLT study focused on understanding the psychology of
password management, researchers found that manipulating the psychological distance,
such as time, can positively influence the tradeoff between security and convenience to
influence individuals to follow secure behavior (Tam, Glassman, & Vandenwauver,
2010).
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A construal, in the context of information security is equivalent to a thereat
context. CLT suggests that the concreteness or abstractness of a construal as experienced
by the individual governs their behavioral choice. The key psychological constructs that
capture these behavioral choices are desirability and feasibility. These constructs are
similar to the PMT constructs of threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Liberman and
Trope (1998), explained that the distinction between feasibility and desirability
corresponds to the distinction between means and ends. Desirability refers to the
outcome, ends, or goals, whereas feasibility considerations explain action alternatives to
achieve the desired outcome or goals.
In this section, we outline the two new constructs based on CLT – threat undesirability and coping feasibility. We compare and contrast these with existing
conceptualization from PMT regarding threat appraisal and coping appraisal. We also
present arguments of how these fit into the model and why they in turn influence
behavioral choice. The application of CLT in the context of information security
explains individuals’ psychological processes that influence the perception of the undesirability of a threat and the feasibility of the countermeasure in terms of personal
psychological distance.
3.4.2 Threat Un-desirability
Threat un-desirability refers to the perception of the extent to which an individual
will personally be affected by the threat. Consistent with CLT primes, abstract
knowledge about an event directs individual’s attention to the desirability of that event
(Ho et al., 2015). In the context of information security, the abstractness or concreteness
of knowledge regarding information threats can be perceived in terms of threat un-
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desirability. Therefore, it is relevant to re-conceptualize the threat appraisal from a
personal un-desirability perspective (threat un-desirability). While the evaluation of
threat un-desirability sounds similar to the PMT construct of threat appraisal, which is the
personal perception regarding the severity of and vulnerability to a threat (Rogers, 1983),
it differs in three ways, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Threat Appraisal Compared to Threat Un-Desirability
Threat Appraisal

Definition

Locus
Measuring what
Process

Threat un-Desirability

The individuals’
assessment of their own
safety if they follow a
certain risky behavior
(Floyd et al., 2000)

The extent to which an
individual perceives the personal
impact by the threat

Organization

Individual - Threat

Magnitude

Psychological distance

Cognitive assessment

Affective assessment

As Table 5 shows, threat un-desirability differs from threat appraisal in three
ways: locus, measures, and process. The original context of PMT refers to threat
appraisal as the individuals’ assessment of their own safety if they follow a certain
behavior (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). However, the locus of threat appraisal in
information security research is how well an individual understands organizational threat
(Warkentin et al., 2016). The position of the threat was removed from a personal threat
and became an organizational threat. Threat un-desirability refers to the extent to which
an individual will perceive a personal impact by the threat. Therefore, threat undesirability’s locus is the individual.
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Another difference between threat appraisal and threat un-desirability in the
context of information security is the measure of threat impact. The appraisal of
information security threats measures the magnitude of damage towards the organization
(Sommestad et al., 2015). Threat un-desirability measures the perception of the threat
based on psychological distance from the individual. For example, people find it less
desirable to share private information on a government website because the perception of
exposure to a personal threat is greater (Crossler, 2010). By contrast, violations against
organizational information can be more desired if it leads to increased productivity
(Siponen & Vance, 2010).
The third difference between threat appraisal and threat un-desirability is the basis
of the process of threat by the individual. Threat appraisal is a process that influences the
individual’s cognition regarding a specific threat to motivate protection (Sommestad et
al., 2015). However, as we argued earlier, despite the importance of cognition,
behavioral drivers are affective. Threat un-desirability is the affective assessment of the
threat that motivates behavioral choice.
Literature shows that the threat appraisal process is conceptualized through
organizational threat. Threats to the security of organizational information are broadly
construed to mean modification, destruction, theft, or lack of availability of
organizational computing assets and services (Straub & Welke, 1998). That places
abstractness to the threat and increases the psychological distance directing perception
towards desirability (Krishna, 2012; Trope et al., 2007). Lack of information security
knowledge presents abstract perception of security threats which may lead an employee
to believe that security violations are less harmful (Vance et al., 2012). Literature

53
supports that complex security measures, which increase psychological distance from the
employee, may increase violations’ desirability (D'Arcy et al., 2014). People find it less
desirable to share private information on a public website because the appraisal of threat
is greater (Crossler, 2010). However, the increase in productivity justifies violations
against organizational information (Siponen & Vance, 2010). Therefore, consistent with
CLT propositions of psychological distance, PMT construct threat appraisal can be
reframed on a personal level in terms of threat un-desirability.
The appraisal of the threat is strongly related to protection motivation when the
target of the threat is the person himself or herself but not someone else or the
organization (Sommestad et al., 2015). Therefore, consistent with CLT, the concrete
perception of a threat and its severity brings this threat to a closer psychological distance
to the individual increasing threat un-desirability and increasing protection motivation.
Threat assessment will shape employees’ attitude towards compliance (Herath & Rao,
2009b; Warkentin et al., 2016). Individuals are more likely to follow protective behavior
when the threat’s damaging impact is severe (Vance et al., 2012; Workman et al., 2008).
Information security literature supports that severity of the threat and its harmful impact
significantly affect employees’ concerns regarding security breaches (Chen et al., 2012;
Herath & Rao, 2009b). In the information security domain, PMT has been used in
contexts where the threat is rather abstract (Sommestad et al., 2015) and vulnerability is
explained to be towards the organizational information systems rather than the individual
(Johnston et al., 2015). Thus, employees may feel invulnerable to the threat. Abstract
perception of threats increases the personal psychological distance to the threat directing
the individual perception to the desirability of the threat.
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Employees may rationalize violations when threat is abstract (Siponen & Vance,
2010). The personal understanding of the damaging details of the threat will bring threat
to a closer psychological distance, which will increase threat un-desirability. Threat undesirability is the personal assessment of the damaging impact of the threat. When
threats are explained in more detail, threats become less desirable. Therefore, with the
decreased desirability of the threat, employees’ secure behavior can become a personal
behavioral choice. As threats become less desirable by the employee, the more motivated
the employee can be to follow protective behavior. Therefore, the following hypothesis
is proposed:
H4: The greater the threat un-desirability, the higher the protection motivation.
3.4.3 Coping Feasibility
Coping feasibility refers to the process by which individuals evaluate the
effectiveness of the available risk mitigating behavior. Individuals’ attitude is influenced
by their evaluation of the feasibility of the response (Warkentin et al., 2016). Feasibility
consideration focuses on the level of difficulty regarding the action alternatives to
achieve the desired outcome or goals. CLT research supports that the increased
knowledge regarding how to apply a recommended action directs individuals’ perception
to feasibility of the action (Köhler et al., 2011). As knowledge explains the details and
the features of the coping mechanism, intentions will be focused on the feasibility (Ho et
al., 2015). Therefore, it is relevant to re-conceptualize the response appraisal from the
feasibility perspective (response feasibility). The difference between coping appraisal
and coping feasibility is shown in Table 6.
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Table 6: Coping Appraisal Compared to Coping Feasibility
Coping Appraisal

Definition

Locus
Measuring what
Basis

Coping Feasibility

The coping appraisal is the
process by which individuals
evaluate how effective,
manageable, and feasible the
available risk mitigating
response can be (Ifinedo, 2012)

Coping feasibility refers to an
individual’s attitude towards
the efficacy and difficulty of
the individual action required
to prevent / mitigate the threat

Task

Individual - Action

Effectiveness and Skill

Difficulty perception

Efficacy

Effort

As Table 6 shows, coping feasibility differs from coping appraisal in three ways:
locus, measures, and process. The original intent of PMT posits that coping appraisal is
the process by which individuals evaluate how effective, manageable, and feasible the
available risk mitigating response can be (Ifinedo, 2012). The locus of coping appraisal
in the context of information security is the task to be performed by the individual.
Coping feasibility is concerned with the individual’s perception of the ease (difficulty) in
performing a successful mitigating action. Therefore, the locus of coping feasibility is
the individual.
Another difference between coping appraisal and coping feasibility in the context
of information security is what is being measured. Coping appraisal is concerned with
the availability of a coping mechanism and the ability to perform what is required to avert
the threat (Floyd et al., 2000). Coping feasibility is the process by which an individual’s
attitude towards a recommended secure behavior is based on the perception of the degree
of difficulty to follow that behavior. This research argues in the model that the end user’s
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perception of threat drives the behavior. Therefore, it is relevant to measure the
individual’s perception of the desired secure behavior, or response efficacy, and the
degree of difficulty to follow that behavior, or response difficulty.
Finally, the basis of the process of coping appraisal is the individuals’ belief in
their ability to implement a certain prescribed coping mechanism. Coping appraisal basis
are self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response cost (Boss et al., 2015). Coping
feasibility is based on the individual’s perception of the adequacy of the mitigating
action, response efficacy, and the associated efforts needed to implement successfully
that available action, or response difficulty.
Researcher found that the individuals perception of the available response has the
most significant influence on forming intentions and behavior (Sommestad et al., 2015).
Individuals’ belief in their own abilities to perform what is required to avert the threat can
influence intentions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). The positive perception is enabled by
employees’ relevant knowledge, competence and capability to implement preventative
security measures (Ifinedo, 2012). Researchers have shown that the individual’s capacity
to participate in an affordable threat mitigating action can positively influence intentions
(Herath & Rao, 2009a; Sommestad et al., 2015). When organizations engage people to
implement protective actions that they actually can take, they are more motivated for
protection (Warkentin et al., 2016). Information security literature suggests the positive
impact of the feasibility of response on employees’ intentions (Johnston et al., 2015;
Warkentin et al., 2016). The literature suggests that when the desired response is clear
and not abstract, protection motivation increases (Sommestad et al., 2015), and that is
consistent with CLT, as details direct perception to feasibility (Ho et al., 2015).
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Interestingly, researchers found that the increased complexity and difficulty of the
desired protective response had a negative impact on protection motivation (D'Arcy et al.,
2014). Hindrance to employees’ productivity caused by security requirements is one of
the reasons for employees to neglect the recommended behavior (Herath & Rao, 2009b).
Employees may actually feel justified not to follow secure behavior if it is perceived to
be convoluted and gets in the way of their productivity (Siponen & Vance, 2010). The
increased cost of secure behavior can have a negative impact on protection motivation
(Herath & Rao, 2009b). Research findings suggest that if the response is not feasible,
employees may not follow it.
Coping feasibility is the personal assessment of response efficacy and the
difficulty to follow that response. As researchers suggested, based on the original intents
of PMT, as the coping feasibility increases, the protection motivation also increases.
Furthermore, as the complexity of the coping mechanisms decreases, the protection
motivation increases. Therefore, we argue that the increased coping feasibility can
positively impact the individual’s motivation to follow a secure behavior. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the higher the protection motivation.
3.5 Secure Behavior
The primary focus of PMT is to predict intentions toward protection motivation
(Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Researchers argued that PMT was successfully extended to
predict behavior and not just the motivation because there is a link to actual behavior
(Floyd et al., 2000). The goal is not just to motivate employees but also to change their
behavior. PMT can be applied to measure actual behavior (Crossler et al., 2013).
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Protection motivation, similar to other types of motivation, reflects the level of desire and
willingness that directs behavior (Floyd et al., 2000). Researchers argued that protection
motivation is the strongest predictor of behavioral change (Boss et al., 2015). Thus,
although the independent variable in this research is protection motivation, this
independent variable can be used as a proxy to predict the actual secure behavior.
Prior research efforts demonstrated a clear linkage between intention and actual
behavior (Johnston et al., 2015). This approach is supported by numerous empirical
research studies because the intention is viewed to be an indication of a precondition to a
behavioral act (Siponen et al., 2014). Compliance intention is an antecedent and a strong
predictor of actual behavior (Sommestad & Hallberg, 2013).
3.6 Chapter Summary
The theoretical development presented in this chapter builds on the gaps and
findings synthesized from the reviewed literature. The model conceptualizes
organizational knowledge mechanisms, training and policy, across three dimensions:
breadth, depth, and finesse to explain how any threat is perceived by the end-user. The
proposed model is threat agnostic. This allows the research to be generalizable across
different known threats as well as new threats that may emerge. Knowledge breadth
connects wide range of threats that the organization may face to increase employees’
ability to distinguish between threats that users otherwise may think irrelevant.
Knowledge depth presents the completeness of knowledge in order for employees to
know how to perform any activity. Finesse is the ability to apply innovativeness through
collaboration and brainstorming to create feasible approaches to enhance performance
and increase the feasibility of secure behaviors.
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The model follows PMT to explain the psychological process of protection
motivation that is influenced by the personal perception of threat and the available coping
mechanisms. In the context of information security, PMT showed inconsistent results
due to lack of personalization as threats toward organizations instead of the person did
not accurately present the intent of PMT. CLT provides a means to measure the
psychological constructs of PMT from an individual’s perspective, i.e., personalizing
them. CLT explains that abstract knowledge about an event directs individual’s
perception to the desirability of that event, whereas detailed knowledge directs the
perception towards feasibility. Therefore, it is relevant to re-conceptualize the PMT
constructs (threat appraisal and coping appraisal) from a personal perspective as threat
un-desirability and coping feasibility. Threat un-desirability focuses on the individual’s
perception of a personal impact by the threat. Consistent with CLT, when threats are
explained in more details, threats become less desirable and with the decreased
desirability of the threat, employees’ secure behavior can become a personal behavioral
choice. Similarly, coping feasibility focuses the personal perception on the level of
difficulty regarding the action alternatives to achieve the desired secure behavior. The
increased feasibility of the mitigating action can positively impact the individual’s
motivation to follow a secure behavior. PMT was successfully extended to predict
behavior and not just the motivation. Literature supports that protection motivation is an
antecedent and a strong predictor of actual behavior. Therefore, the presented dependent
variable in this model, protection motivation, should be capable of predicting secure
behavior.

CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter presents the quantitative research design used to test the research
model and to examine the relationships between variables in order to answer the research
questions. The methodological approach proposed in this chapter followed a two-study
approach to answer both research questions:
Q1: What are the key psychological processes that influence employees’ secure
behavior when dealing with an information security threat?
Q2: How do organizational knowledge mechanisms such as SETA programs and
policies influence key psychological processes of threat perception?
Study one is an experiment designed to answer the first research question. In
many research studies, experimental models are used when a convenience sample is
possible with naturally formed groups such as students in a classroom (Creswell, 2014).
Study two evaluates the entire research model, thus answering both research questions.
Study two employs a quantitative survey design. The data is collected online from a
sample of full-time working professionals. The survey assesses the relationships between
the input constructs (knowledge dimensions), process constructs (threat un-desirability
and coping feasibility), and the output construct (protection motivation). The proposed
approach is consistent with recommendations from the marketing and information
systems literature.
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The following sections will explain each of the two studies. The sections will
address the design, constructs involved, samples used, procedures, and data collection
methods. The concluding section will summarize studies conducted.
4.1 Study One
The first research question aims to understand the key psychological processes of
threat perception. To answer this question, the focus was on a subset of the research
model. The entire research model was investigated in study two. Study one research
model is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Study one model diagram
Study one measures how the concreteness or abstractness of a threat context
impacts the participants’ affective perception of that threat’s un-desirability and coping
feasibility. Therefore, in study one, a known threat context is manipulated and presented
to participants with either concreteness or in a high level of abstraction. This scenario
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manipulation allows the researchers to measure the impact of the key constructs of the
psychological process, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, on protection
motivation.
4.1.1 Research Method
To empirically validate the manipulation checks for these key psychological
processes, this study applies a valid and operationalizable scenario-based, experimental
research design. The intent of the experimental design is to test the impact of a treatment
on the outcome (Creswell, 2014). In study one, the treatment is a scenario-based
manipulation of the degree of abstractness or concreteness of a known threat context to
measuring the impact on protection motivation. Using a scenario-based experiment
allows the researcher to establish a reliable and valid measure for behavioral intention as
it relates to the various factors found in the scenario (Willison, Warkentin, & Johnston,
2018). The use of experimental methods offer a high internal validity and allows for
statistical controls (S. Gupta, 2006). The direct comparison of effects, while controlling
other factors that might offer competing explanations, as well as the replications of the
phenomenon provide high internal validity (Poole & DeSanctis, 2004). However, cross
sectional studies do not account for maturation or history of participants or threats
therefore they are limited in longitudinal generalization.
The experiment applies a scenario-based survey to validate empirically the
instrument to measure the impact of these manipulations on protection motivation. Using
a scenario-based analysis has been established and applied to IS research (Willison et al.,
2018). This experiment is designed based on previous literature recommendations
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(Campbell & Stanley, 1963, p. 50). In this design, the experimental control is achieved
or enhanced by entering all groups into all manipulations.
4.1.2 Sample
The selected sample frame used for this experiment was undergraduate students
enrolled in various business programs from a university in southeast region of the United
States of America. This sample frame is appropriate because business students represent
a sample of information systems end users who have valuable information that should be
protected. Information systems literature shows that the use of students in information
systems research is a common practice (Chatterjee et al., 2015). In the specific context of
information security, Warkentin et al. (2016), supported the use of students as a reliable
sampling frame for two reasons. First, students are members of an organization that
requires information security compliance. Also, students are individuals with valuable
informational assets, and therefore, they are subject to protection motivation factors as
any system user. Therefore, the university business students present an adequate and
relevant sample to evaluate factors impacting the perception of threat un-desirability and
coping feasibility.
Participants were invited to participate in the experiment on a voluntary basis. All
participating students received course credit. As this study focused on the psychological
perception of knowledge workers, end-users, students majoring in Information Systems
or Information Security were not included in the sample, as these students may not
represent the typical end users. Also, they may represent perceptions influenced by prior
experiences with security breaches. Some researchers addressed the positive relationship
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between prior experiences with security incidents and protection motivation (Boss et al.,
2015; D. Lee et al., 2008).
The determination of sample size impacts the power analysis (Hair, Black, Babin,
& Anderson, 2010, p. 174). As explained in Creswell (2014, p. 169), for experimental
research, researchers use power analysis to identify the appropriate sample size for the
groups. Researchers set values for three factors involved in the calculations of the
sample size (alpha = 0.05, power = 0.80, and effect size = 0.5). As shown in the sample
size table, Cohen (1988, p. 54), the appropriate sample size according to these three
values is 50 participants for each group. This is also consistent with Hair, Black, Babin,
Anderson, and Tatham (1998), as they stated a rule of thumb to require at least sample of
50 to maintain power at 0.80. G*Power software was also used to calculate the needed
sample size. The calculated sample size by the software was consistent with the literature
recommendation. Therefore, our target sample size for each group was 65 participants to
account for unusable responses.
4.1.3 Experimental Procedure Manipulation
Following the Campbell and Stanley (1963) design, the experiment was applied in
a randomized manner, as illustrated in Figure 5.

RG1 XC1 O

XA1 O

RG2 XA2 O

XC2 O

Figure 5. Experiment design diagram
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The design contains three classifications: RG is the random group, X is the
manipulation, and O is the observation. Each treatment occurred once (XC denotes the
manipulations based on a concrete scenario, and XA denotes the manipulations based on
an abstract scenario). The subscript numbers in the diagram represents whether group 1
or group 2.
Students were randomly split into two groups, RG1 and RG2 as denoted in the
diagram in Figure 5, to enhance external validity. Creswell (2014, p. 158) recommended
randomization to increase the ability to generalize to a population. For the random group
assignments, the randomization feature in Qualtrics Research Suite software was applied.
Qualtrics software allows the researcher to evenly and randomly split participants into
two groups based on a specified branching condition. In this experiment, the branching
condition was either group 1 or group 2. This option automatically assigned each student
randomly to be placed in one of the two groups and see only the part of the survey
assigned to that group.
Each group received a one pair of scenarios (an abstract scenario and a concrete
scenario) for a specific security threat context to work with. All participants in group 1
received the concrete version of scenario 1 (Xc1), while at the same time, all participants
in group 2 received the abstract version of scenario 2 (XA2). The scenarios were
presented as animated short videos to both groups. The use of animation allows more
control over the time needed to understand the scenarios. After watching the animated
videos, students recorded their observations. For the observations, students were given
scales that measured their perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.
When all scenario observations were recorded for both groups, the same process was
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repeated; however, group 1 received the abstract version of scenario 1 (XA1) while group
2 received the concrete version of scenario 2 (XC2).
It is argued here that the concrete description of a scenario, according to CLT,
will construe the threat on a closer psychological distance from the participant directing
their perception to the coping feasibility and increasing threat un-desirability. Also, the
abstract scenario will construe the threat on a high psychological distance that will
decrease the perception of threat un-desirability and reduce the perception of coping
feasibility. The psychological distance was manipulated across the following distance
dimensions:


Temporal was measured by past, current, or future



Spatial was measured by a nearby location compared to somewhere else



Social was measured by events happening to self, known people, or random
people



Hypothetical was measured by true situations or imaginary activities

By manipulating the degree of abstractness or concreteness, the individual’s protection
motivation will be impacted through threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. Hence,
we developed the following hypotheses, as explained in the previous chapter and
presented in the model, regarding threat un-desirability and coping feasibility:
H4: The greater the threat un-desirability, the higher the protection motivation
H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the higher the protection motivation.
To increase the contextual relevance, as explained by Siponen and Vance (2014),
the scenarios clearly described the participant’s setting, environment, and the event that
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the participant was thinking about and had worked with. Each participant was asked to
watch the scenarios and then respond to an online scenario-based survey instrument. The
instrument measured threat un-desirability and coping feasibility perception among
participants. See Appendix B for complete details regarding both scenarios, including the
concrete and abstract written versions and the manipulation checks. The full instrument
used for study one is included in Appendix C.
4.1.4 Measurements
As explained in the previous chapter, threat un-desirability refers to the extent to
which an individual will perceive a personal impact by the threat. This was measured by
the individual’s psychological distance from a specific threat context. The experiment
manipulated all four dimensions of psychological distance based on CLT. On the other
hand, coping feasibility is concerned with the individual’s attitude towards the mitigating
action and the perception of the ease or difficulty in performing that threat mitigating
action. This was measured by the individual’s perception of response efficacy and
difficulty. The experiment was used to manipulate participant’s perception of the ease or
difficulty to perform the desired coping mechanism. The dependent variable was
protection motivation.
The scenarios described above were presented to the participants to measure their
perceptions of threat un-desirability. After dealing with each threat scenario, participants
were asked to rate their perceptions that reflected their own psychological distance from
this threat context. Table 7 includes the psychological distance rating.
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Table 7: Psychological Distance Rating
I believe that the risk from the threat is
Distant/Future impact

1-7 scale

Imminent impact

General/Generic

1-7 scale

Personal

Made-up/Hypothetical

1-7 scale

Real

Far away/Somewhere else

1-7 scale

Close/Here

Coping feasibility was measured by evaluating the participants’ perception of
response efficacy and response difficulty. The participants’ perception of coping
feasibility was manipulated by the threat scenarios described above. Coping feasibility is
a higher order construct that was measured by two formative constructs, response
efficacy and response difficulty. The scale that measured response difficulty was adopted
from S. Gupta (2006) (α = 0.946) and the scale that measured response efficacy was
adopted from Workman et al. (2008) (α = 0.85). The instruments adopted were slightly
modified to better match the specific context of this research. On a scale from 1-7, where
1 is strongly disagree and 7 is strongly agree, participants were asked to rate their own
agreement with the coping feasibility questions. Table 8 shows the modified questions
used in this research based on the original instruments by S. Gupta (2006) and Workman
et al. (2008).
Table 8: Coping Feasibility Instrument
Coping feasibility
Response Difficulty from S. Gupta (2006) α = 0.946
Modified Instrument



Protecting myself from this threat complicates my job tasks
Protecting myself from this threat will make my current job mentally
demanding
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Protecting myself from this threat requires a lot of thought and problem-solving
in my current job

Response Efficacy from Workman et al. (2008) (α = 0.85)
Modified Instrument




Solutions available to keep my organization’s information / information
systems safe from the threat are successful
The available measures that I can take to protect my organization’s information
/ information systems from the threat are effective
The preventive measures available to me to stop the threat are adequate

Finally, to measure protection motivation, the items below were adopted from
Posey et al. (2015) with α = 0.64. On a scale from 1-7 where 1 is strongly disagree and 7
is strongly agree, participants were asked how motivated they are to take immediate
action by rating the following:
1. I will protect myself from this specific threat
2. I will engage in activities to protect myself from this specific threat
3. I will prevent this specific security threat from being successful
4.1.5 Process and Statistical Control
It is important to identify factors that may interfere with outcomes and provide
false positives. Controls are introduced to eliminate any external influence. Controlling
for factors that may interfere with the outcome is critical so that participation in one
group or the other will not impact the outcome (Creswell, 2014). Controlling for factors
that might offer competing external explanations leads to a clearer analysis of the impact
of psychological manipulation on the output behavior, which in this case was protection
motivation. Through the use of experimental controls, it is possible to access perception
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and the impacts on protection motivation without the confounding factors present in real
settings.
In this study we statistically controlled for the demographic of the sample such as
gender, age, and computer experience. These controls are commonly used in information
security behavioral research (Boss et al., 2015; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao,
2009b). We also proposed to statistically control for risk appetite. Risk appetite or risk
propensity is defined as an individual’s tendency to take or avoid riskier decisions (Sitkin
& Weingart, 1995). Therefore, we statistically controlled for participants’ risk
propensity. The five-item scale (α = .86) from research by Sitkin and Weingart (1995)
was used to measure risk propensity. The five-item scale is shown in Appendix A.
As part of study one, prior to conducting the survey, an expert panel comprising
of four experts in research design and instrument development reviewed each scenario to
ensure realistic scenario contents and validate the presence of all psychological distance
dimensions. Following the panel’s recommendations, minor changes were applied to the
survey, such as word modifications.
4.1.6 Analysis
To assess the consistency and reliability of the scale measuring threat undesirability, a paired t-test method was used. Paired t-tests are used to determine the
difference in mean responses among groups (Hendrickson, Massey, & Cronan, 1993).
Also, to further increase the external validity of the manipulations, the experiment used
concrete and abstract versions of two threat scenarios to present a more realistic and
generalizable assessment of psychological process output that would be applicable in any
professional organization. In the meantime, the partial least squares (PLS) statistical
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analysis was performed to measure the relationship between independent variables (threat
un-desirability and coping feasibility) and the dependent variable protection motivation.
This approach has been established in business research (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011).
Descriptive statistics such as age, gender, degree level, major, and computer use
was provided to explain the structure of the participants. Manipulation checks were
designed to measure the variability in perception based on the psychological distance
changes. To see the difference in perceptions, the measurement and the structural
components of the model used for study one were tested using paired t-test and a path
analysis modeling SEM technique. The component-based partial least squares (PLS)
approach was used to evaluate the model proposed in study one.
4.2 Study Two
The objective of study two is to test the entire research model. The second
research question aims to understand the way organizational knowledge mechanisms
such as SETA programs and policy influence key psychological processes of threat
perception. To answer this question, study two evaluated the entire research model as
shown in Figure 6.

72

Figure 6. Research model
The model represents the impact of knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and
finesse) on protection motivation, while fully mediated by the individual’s affective
perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. The model created, in a form
of input-process-output, is suitable for analysis based on the hypothesized relationships.
The following hypotheses that were explained in the previous chapter was tested:
H1: The greater the breadth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the greater
the un-desirability of threat by end-users.
H2: The greater the depth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the higher the
coping feasibility.
H3: The greater the finesse, the higher the coping feasibility.
H4: The greater the threat un-desirability, the higher the protection motivation.
H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the higher the protection motivation.
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4.2. 1 Research Methods
Study two implemented a web-based survey design for data collection. Survey
design enables a generalizable quantitative description of the targeted population’s
attitudes (Creswell, 2014). Online surveys provide several advantages, such as economy,
speed of return, error checking, a computer assisted instrument, time to provide
thoughtful answers, anonymity, and a far reaching geographical distribution (Fowler Jr,
2013). Web-based surveys have been previously used in similar research to enable data
collection from a large sample of business professionals (Crossler, 2010).
A holistic approach, considering critical aspects for survey process, was followed
as explained in the literature. It is critical to consider the basic steps in survey process,
such as defined objectives, population and sample frame, data collection strategy, time,
budget, resources constraints, the questionnaire creation, data collection, and data
analysis (Sue & Ritter, 2007). The survey is cross-sectional, with the data collected at
one point of time from business professionals. Participants were asked to complete the
online questionnaire while imagining themselves facing a context of a real information
security threat. To reduce problems with the reliability and validity of questionnaire,
whenever possible, we adopted the items from previously validated studies. Using
validated and tested questions improves the reliability of results (Straub, 1989).
4.2.2. Sample
A key requirement for a high quality sample is representativeness of the
population of interest (Hair et al., 2010, p. 523). Selecting the appropriate representative
sample provides the ability to generalize to the population (Creswell, 2014, p. 158). The
survey was sent out to a diverse sample of business professionals for data collection. As
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this study aims to understand end-user psychological perception regarding information
security threats, the data were collected from a random sample of full-time business
professionals who use information systems for their daily jobs. The sample did not
include unemployed, retired professionals, or labor workers who do not use enterprise
information systems daily to accomplish their job related tasks. Because this sample may
not reflect the end user’s psychological perception regarding information security threats.
Also, IT professionals were excluded from the sample, as their prior experiences may
influence their motivation to protect information (Boss et al., 2015; D. Lee et al., 2008).
Based on the set of factors explained by Hair et al. (2010, p. 644), the minimum
sample size used for this study should be 150 participants. However, to account for the
missing data and unusable responses, more than 200 responses were collected to ensure
an adequate sample size that can be used for the data analysis process. The sample
included males, females, full-time employees, senior experienced professionals, and
junior professionals in organizations within the Unites States. The data that was collected
targeted an evenly distributed sample of employees in terms of age, gender, employment
type, and work location. Such heterogeneity of the data sample supports
representativeness for the targeted population and reduces potential bias arising from a
limited employee representation in the data collection process.
4.2.3 Measurements
Validated measuring scales were used in this study. The survey adapted items
used by Zhou and Li (2012) to measure knowledge breadth and knowledge depth. The
survey included three questions for items measuring knowledge breadth (α = 0.84) and
three questions for items measuring knowledge depth (α = 0.78). Also, the survey
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included adapt items used by Munro et al. (1997) to measure finesse. A slight
modification of the instrument was applied to better align the instrument to the specific
context of information security. Table 9 shows the modified instrument used in this
research to measure knowledge dimensions.
Table 9: Knowledge Dimensions Items
Knowledge Breadth (α = 0.84) by Zhou and Li (2012)
Modified Instrument
My organization's information security policies and training programs help me:




Acquire diversified and wide-ranging security knowledge
Accumulate knowledge of multiple security threats
Gain variety of technical knowledge about information security

Knowledge Depth (α = 0.78) by Zhou and Li (2012)
Modified Instrument
My organization's information security policies and training programs give me:




Thorough understanding and experience of specific security threats
In-depth knowledge of the key information security threats that we face
Technical skills to mitigate specific threats targeting my domain of work

Finesse (α = 0.78) by Zhou and Li (2012)
Modified Instrument
My organization's information security policies and training programs allow me to:


Leads to new solutions to replace older threat mitigating actions

Knowledge Finesse Munro et al. (1997)
Modified Instrument
My organization's information security policies and training programs allow me to:



Apply my experience innovatively to face new and different security threats
Be creative to solve security problems at work

The same items used in study one were also used in this study to measure threat undesirability and coping feasibility constructs. Finally, protection motivation, as explained
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earlier, was be measured by three items. Please refer to Appendix A for full details
regarding items measuring protection motivation.
All constructs were measured formatively with multiple items on a seven-point
Likert scales. Table 10 presents a summary of all used constructs in study two. The full
instrument used to measure study two constructs is included in Appendix C.
Table 10: Constructs Summary
Construct

α

Cited

Knowledge Breadth

0.84

Zhou and Li (2012)

Knowledge Depth

0.78

Zhou and Li (2012)

Knowledge Finesse

NA

Munro et al. (1997)

Threat un-Desirability

NA

Authors

Coping Feasibility: Response Difficulty

0.946

(S. Gupta, 2006)

Coping Feasibility: Response Efficacy

0.85

Workman et al. (2008)

Protection Motivation

0.64

Posey et al. (2015)

Protection Motivation

0.983

Johnston et al. (2018)

Risk Propensity (statistical control)

0.86

Sitkin and Weingart (1995)

4.2.4 Process and Statistical Controls
Data were collected using online survey. The online survey was designed and
completed using Qualtrics Research Suite software. A professional company was
contracted for the recruitment of participants and the administration of the online survey.
The benefits of using professional survey provider was extensively discussed in the
literature (Creswell, 2014; Sue & Ritter, 2007). Similar to study one, study two
statistically controlled for the demographic of the sample, such as gender, age, computer
experience. These controls are commonly used in information security behavioral
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research (Boss et al., 2015; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009b). This study also
controlled for risk appetite, as it impacts individuals’ tendency to make risker decisions
(Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Therefore, risk propensity was measured in this study.
Participants were asked to imagine themselves facing a particular known
information security threat and imagine their own actions while completing the survey
questions. The survey was based on the items explained earlier. Based on the analysis of
all responses, the incomplete, missing, or unreliable responses were discarded.
4.2.5 Hypothesis and Data Analysis
Knowledge breadth represents the broad understanding of wide range of diverse
information security threats. Three reflective indicator items measured knowledge
breadth. This study proposes a positive impact of knowledge breadth on the undesirability of threat by end-users. Knowledge depth represents complete understanding
of steps needed to address any threat in a specific context. Three reflective indicator
items measured knowledge depth. This study proposes a positive impact of knowledge
depth on the coping feasibility. Finesse is the ability to creativeness and innovativeness
to the available course of action. Five reflective indicator items measured finesse. This
study proposes a positive impact of finesse on the coping feasibility.
The measurement and the structural components of the entire model was tested
using SEM technique. SEM is an appropriate statistical approach to examine the
relationships of the entire theoretical model (Hair et al., 2010). While SEM is a general
term encompassing a variety of statistical models, the theoretical model proposed in this
study will be tested using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM).
The PLS-SEM is the preferred method when the objective is prediction of structural

78
relationships (Hair et al., 2011). PLS-SEM is increasingly applied approach to examine
structural equation (Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Mena, 2012). The use of PLS-SEM is an
appropriate approach as it has the ability to handle sample size issues better. It also can
handle complex theoretical models, such as the proposed model in this study and provide
accurate estimates. Smart-PLS software package was used for the data analysis.
The demographic characteristics of the participants were reported. Descriptive
statistics of the participants, such as age, gender, education level, work experience, work
division or department, and computer experience was provided to explain the structure of
the participants. The five item scale for risk propensity, adapted from Sitkin and
Weingart (1995), were also used as a control variable.
As recommended by Hair et al. (2011), construct reliability and validity must be
considered to guarantee an accurate measurement of the constructs used. Accordingly,
the quality of the constructs was assessed by examining the factor loading for internal
validity and Cronbach’s alpha for reliability. Factors show small Cronbach alpha
indicating low correlation between items. The calculated Cronbach’s Alpha and
Composite Reliability should show scale reliability and internal consistency of constructs
in the model with all values above 0.7. Reliability is the measure of how highly
interrelated the items or indicators that measure the construct with each other to reflect
that all indicators actually measure the same thing. High reliability is associated with low
measurement error (Hair et al., 2010).

CHAPTER 5 – DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter focuses on the data analysis conducted to empirically validate the
relationships between variables in the proposed model. First, we discuss study one and
associated statistical controls, as well as constructs validity and reliability. The study
focused on the subset of the entire model that addresses the impact of the perception of
threat un-desirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation. Study one also
includes comparative analysis to compare the traditional PMT model to the model
presented by this research. Following study one data analysis, we will discuss study two
and evaluate the results to test each hypothesis. Finally, we provide findings and results
for each of the hypotheses tested. The following sections below explain the details of the
data analysis process.
5.1 Study One Data Analysis
Study one is an experiment designed to measure how concreteness or abstractness
of a threat context influences the participants’ affective perception of that threat’s undesirability and coping feasibility. In this experiment, a certain threat context was
manipulated and presented to participants with either concreteness or in a high level of
abstraction.
5.1.1 Sample Frame and Used Sample
The selected sample frame for study one was undergraduate students enrolled in
various business major programs from a university in southeast region of the United
79
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States of America. Students were invited to voluntarily participate in the study.
Instructors of several business classes announced to their students that they would receive
an anonymous web link to the survey and encouraged them to participate.
The survey link was shared with 457 students enrolled in various business classes.
From the total students received the link, 314 students participated in the survey. The
response rate was 68.7%. Survey responses were inspected for completeness and
accuracy. Consequently, 36 incomplete responses were removed. An additional 16
responses from computer science and information systems students were removed. The
total number of responses used in the data analysis was 262 responses, 57.3% of the
sample frame.
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
The 262 responses utilized included 49.2% females, 50.0% males, and 0.8%
preferred not to disclose. For the majority of respondents, 95.0%, were between 18 and
30 years old. Students from all four academic classes participated in the survey,
including 8.8% freshmen, 32.4% sophomores, 27.5% juniors, and 31.3% seniors. The
262 participants were split evenly and randomly into two groups using Qualtrics, the
online research software. Each group included 131 participants and had a balanced
demographic distribution. Both groups one and two each received one pair of scenarios
(an abstract scenario and a concrete scenario) for two specific threat contexts to work
with.
This study considered several control factors that could influence participants’
protection motivation such as participants’ age, gender, academic class, major, computer
experience, and risk appetite. These control variables were included in the data analysis
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to account for the influence of these variables on protection motivation. An independent
sample t-test was conducted to compare means of all of the statistical control variables,
gender, age, academic class, academic major, computer experience, and risk appetite.
The analysis of the results of the independent sample t-test regarding all experimental
control variables showed no significance in the difference between the two groups for all
statistical control variables. Table 11 shows the detailed results of the independent
sample t-test for all the experimental/statistical controls.
Table 11: Groups Independent Sample t-test for all Experimental Statistical Controls
Group Statistics
Controls

Group 1
Mean (SD)

Group 2
Mean (SD)

Mean
Difference

Sig. (2-tailed)

Computer Experience

3.01 (.72)

3.07(.81)

-.06

.52

Risk Appetite

2.87(.96)

2.94 (1.06)

-.07

.58

Gender

1.54 (.54)

1.48 (.50)

.057

.377

Age

2.35 (.67)

2.33 (.66)

.023

.780

Class

2.82 (.98)

2.81 (.98)

.008

.950

Major

6.21 (1.93)

6.47 (1.83)

-.260

.265

*p < 0.05;
As the results show in Table 11, there was no significant difference between
groups. The automated randomization process for groups was successful, and the
analysis concluded that both groups were equal. Consequently, these statistical controls
were dropped from any further analysis of results in study one.
5.1.3 Construct Validity and Reliability
The next step was performed to test the construct validity and reliability of the
key measures used in this study – threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection
motivation. The proposed measures for threat un-desirability are the four dimensions of
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the psychological distance forming the threat un-desirability higher order construct. The
four dimensions are temporal (TUDPD-Temp), social (TUDPD-Soci), spatial (TUDPDSpat), and hypothetical (TUDPD-Hypo). Three items labeled TUDPD-Temp1, TUDPDTemp2, and TUDPD-Temp3 measured the temporal dimension. The social dimension
was measure by three items labeled TUDPD-Soci1, TUDPD-Soci2, and TUDPD-Soci3.
The spatial dimension was measure by three items labeled TUDPD-Spat1, TUDPDSpat2, and TUDPD-Spat3. The hypothetical dimension was measure by three items
labeled TUDPD-Hypo1, TUDPD-Hypo2, and TUDPD-Hypo3. The measures for higher
order coping feasibility construct are the two formative constructs, response difficulty
(RD) and response efficacy (RE). The response difficulty construct was measured by
three items (RD1, RD2, RD3) and the response efficacy construct was measured by three
items (RE1, RE2, RE3). Finally, the protection motivation construct was measured by
five items (PM1, PM2, PM3, PM4, PM5).
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to confirm first order
constructs. Software used was Smart-PLS version 3 (Ringle, 2015). The procedures
used were partial least squares (PLS) and PLS bootstrapping (5000 runs). The outer
loadings were analyzed for all items measuring the proposed constructs. Table 12 shows
the outer loadings results for all items.
Table 12: CFA all Items loadings with P-Values
Outer
Loadings

T Statistics
(|O/STDEV|)

P
Values

PM1 <- PM

0.82*

44.12

0.00

PM2 <- PM

0.86*

51.88

0.00

PM3 <- PM

0.87*

69.17

0.00

Items
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PM4 <- PM

0.44*

8.20

0.00

PM5 <- PM

0.85*

53.46

0.00

RD1 <- RD

0.93*

1.92

0.03

RD2 <- RD

0.94*

1.92

0.03

RD3 <- RD

0.89*

1.93

0.03

RE1 <- RE

0.90*

24.16

0.00

RE2 <- RE

0.93*

24.62

0.00

RE3 <- RE

0.88*

22.42

0.00

TUDPDHypo1 <- Hypo

0.87*

60.34

0.00

TUDPDHypo2 <- Hypo

0.86*

61.87

0.00

TUDPDHypo3 <- Hypo

0.01

0.13

0.45

TUDPDSoci1 <- Soci

0.82*

49.41

0.00

TUDPDSoci2 <- Soci

0.74*

23.55

0.00

TUDPDSoci3 <- Soci

0.88*

75.25

0.00

TUDPDSpat1 <- Spat

0.12

1.42

0.08

TUDPDSpat2 <- Spat

0.88*

86.89

0.00

TUDPDSpat3 <- Spat

0.86*

59.25

0.00

TUDPDTemp1 <- Temp

0.82*

38.11

0.00

TUDPDTemp2 <- Temp

0.82*

44.76

0.00

TUDPDTemp3 <- Temp

0.81*

42.91

0.00

*p < 0.05
As shown in table 12, most of the proposed items were significant and showed
strong and high loading scores. However, items TUDPD_Hypo3 and TUDPD_Spat1
showed low loadings at 0.01 and 0.12 respectively. Also, these two items were
statistically not significant, with P-value scores higher than 0.05. Based on the analysis
of the loading results, items TUDPD_Hypo3 and TUDPD_Spat1 were removed.
Removing these items was reasonable to improve the overall model scores.
Following the analysis of outer loadings, using the remaining items, each
construct reliability and validity was tested. The values for composite reliability, the
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Cronbach’s Alpha, the average variance extracted (AVE), and discriminant validity were
checked to evaluate constructs reliability and validity. Table 13 shows the values for
Cronbach’s Alpha, AVE, and composite reliability. The discriminant validity test was
performed, and results were included in Table 13 as well. The results of the discriminant
validity, the diagonal values (in boldface) in the table, were greater than any of the
internal factors correlations (or correlations of the constructs) for all constructs. All AVE
and composite reliability values are indications of conversion validity. Also, all
Cronbach’s Alpha values are high. Although the Cronbach’s Alpha score for the
construct labeled “Hypo”, representing the hypothetical dimension of the psychological
distance to threat un-desirability, was slightly lower than 0.7 at 0.68. All other scores for
this construct such as loadings, composite reliability, AVE, and discriminant validity are
high.
Table 13: Constructs Reliability and Discriminant Validity
Cronbach's Composite
AVE
Alpha
Reliability

PM

RD

RE

Hypo Soci Spat Temp

PM

0.83

0.89

0.62

0.79

RD

0.91

0.94

0.85

-0.05

0.92

RE

0.89

0.93

0.81

0.40

-0.12

0.90

Hypo

0.68

0.86

0.75

0.48

-0.10

0.30

0.87

Soci

0.75

0.86

0.66

0.40

0.06

0.17

0.62

0.81

Spat

0.70

0.87

0.77

0.47

0.02

0.16

0.64

0.73

0.88

Temp

0.75

0.86

0.66

0.50

-0.01

0.24

0.71

0.69

0.73

0.82

The Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio (HTMT) discriminant validity test was performed.
Table 14 displays the summary of the HTMT test results. The test results show that the
values associated with PM, RD, and RE constructs are below the HTMT critical value
and the discriminant validity was established. However, as expected with the
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psychological distance constructs, some of the values were slightly above the HTMT
critical value. Because these are formative constructs and are expected to have cross
loadings, we performed the HTMT test on the latent constructs of the model, PM, CF,
and TuD. Table 15 shows the summary for the HTMT test results on the model’s
constructs. All values in the table were below the HTMT critical value. That confirms
discriminant validity among the model’s constructs.
Table 14: Summary of the HTMT Discriminant Validity Test
PM

RD

RE

Hypo

Soci Spat

RD

0.08

RE

0.47

0.13

Hypo

0.64

0.13

0.39

Soci

0.50

0.09

0.20

0.87

Spat

0.61

0.12

0.20

0.90

1.00

Temp

0.65

0.09

0.29

1.00

0.90 1.00

Table 15: Model Constructs' HTMT Discriminant Validity
CF
PM

0.39

TuD

0.27

PM
0.61

We also examined the Inner VIF for all items. All items VIF scores were less
than the cutoff value of 5. Next, we examined the contribution of each component in the
measurement diagram. Broadly, all of TuD components contributed equally, ranging
from 0.24 for hypothetical TUDPD, to a high of 0.34 for temporal TUDPD. Response
difficulty (RD) showed negative relation at -0.60 with coping feasibility (CF) and
response efficacy (RE) showed positive relation with CF at 0.74. All of these paths were
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statistically significant at p < 0.05. Thus, according to Hair et al. (2010) we concluded
good reliability scores for the higher order constructs, TuD and CF.
5.1.4 Paired and Independent Sample T-Tests
To test whether the concrete and the abstract scenarios presented to each of the
two groups actually created difference in perception, a series of t-tests were performed,
including both paired and independent sample t-tests. Table 16 summarizes the t-tests
results. The paired t-test was performed to compare the difference between means of
threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation within each group
when respondents were presented concrete scenarios versus abstract scenarios. An
independent sample t-test analysis was conducted to compare means of threat undesirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation for both groups during the first
event and the second event. The first event included a concrete scenario presented to
group one and an abstract scenario presented to group two. The second event included
the presentation of an abstract scenario presented to group one and a concrete scenario
presented to group two.
Table 16: T-Test Results Analysis
Group 1 Paired T-Test

PM*

Concrete Mean
(SD)
4.92 (0.63)

Abstract Mean
(SD)
5.37 (1.08)

Mean Difference
(Paired T-Statistic)
-.45 (-5.58)

TuD*

4.90 (0.96)

5.20 (1.03)

-.30 (-3.52)

CF

4.03 (0.76)

4.07 (0.78)

-.04 (-0.70)

Construct

Group 2 Paired T-Test

PM*

Abstract Mean
(SD)

Concrete Mean
(SD)

5.50 (1.01)

5.65 (0.98)

Mean Difference
(Paired T-Statistic)
-0.15 (-2.01)
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TuD*

5.19 (0.86)

5.57 (1.01)

-0.38 (-4.70)

CF

4.33 (0.89)

4.30 (0.95)

+0.3 (0.50)

Mean Difference Across Groups (Independent T-Test Statistic)
PM*

-.58 (-5.57)

-0.28(-2.18)

TuD*

-.29(-2.54)

-0.37(-2.92)

CF*

-.30(-2.98)

-0.22(-2.04)

*P < 0.05
On average, participants of group one showed change in their protection
motivation when given a concrete threat context scenario (M = 4.92, SE = 0.06)
compared to their protection motivation when given an abstract threat context scenario
(M = 5.37, SE = 0.09). This difference, - 0.45, 95% CI [-0.60, -0.29], was significant
t(130) = -5.58, p = 0.000, and represented an effect of d = -0.49. Similarly, participants
showed change in their threat un-desirability perception (M = 4.90, SE = 0.08) compared
to their perception when given an abstract threat scenario (M = 5.20, SE = 0.09). This
difference, - 0.30, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.13], was also significant t(130) = -3.52, p = 0.001,
and represented an effect of d = -0.3. However, change in coping feasibility perception
was not significant. On average participants given a concrete scenario showed change in
their coping feasibility perception (M = 4.03, SE = 0.07) compared to their perception
when given an abstract scenario (M = 4.08, SE = 0.07). This difference, - 0.05, 95% CI
[-0.18, -0.08], was not significant t(130) = -0.7, p = 0.49, and represented an effect of d =
-0.07.
On average, group two participants showed changed in their protection motivation
when given an abstract scenario for a specific threat context (M = 5.50, SE = 0.09)
compared to their perception when given a concrete threat context scenario (M = 5.65, SE
= 0.09). This difference, - 0.15, 95% CI [0.00, 0.29], was significant t(130) = 2.00, p =
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0.047, and represented an effect of d = -0.17. Similarly, participants showed change in
their threat un-desirability perception (M = 5.19, SE = 0.08) compared to their perception
when given a concrete threat context scenario (M = 5.57, SE = 0.09). This difference, 0.38, 95% CI [0.22, 0.54], was significant t(130) = 4.70, p = 0.000, and represented an
effect of d = -0.41. However, change in coping feasibility perception was not significant.
On average, participants given an abstract scenario showed change in their coping
feasibility perception (M = 4.34, SE = 0.08) compared to participants given a concrete
scenario (M = 4.30, SE = 0.08). This difference, 0.04, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.2], was not
significant t(130) = 0.5, p = 0.62, and represented an effect of d = 0.04.
On average, group one participants who were given concrete scenario showed
change in protection motivation (M = 4.92, SE = 0.06) compared to group two
participants who were given an abstract scenario (M = 5.50, SE = 0.09). This difference,
-0.58, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.38], was significant t(260) = -5.57, p = 0.000, and represented an
effect of d = -0.57. In addition, group one participants showed change in threat undesirability perception (M = 4.90, SE = 0.08) compared to group two participants (M =
5.19, SE = 0.08). This difference, -0.29, 95% CI [-0.51, -0.06], was significant t(260) = 2.54, p = 0.012, and represented an effect of d = -0.34. Similarly, on average group one
participants showed change in coping feasibility perception (M = 4.03, SE = 0.07)
compared to group two participants (M = 4.33, SE = 0.08). This difference, -0.3, 95% CI
[-0.51, -0.10], was also significant t(260) = -2.98, p = 0.003, and represented an effect of
d = -0.34.
On average, group one participants who were given an abstract scenario showed
change in protection motivation (M = 5.37, SE = 0.09) compared to group two
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participants who were given a concrete scenario (M = 5.65, SE = 0.09). This difference, 0.28, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.03], was significant t(260) = -2.18, p = 0.030, and represented an
effect of d = -0.29. In addition, on average, group one participants showed change in
threat un-desirability perception (M = 5.20, SE = 0.09) compared to group 2 participants
(M = 5.57, SE = 0.09). This difference, -0.37, 95% CI [-0.61, -0.12], was significant
t(260) = -2.92, p = 0.004, and represented an effect of d = -0.37. Similarly, on average
group one participants showed change in coping feasibility perception (M = 4.08, SE =
0.07) compared to group two participants (M = 4.30, SE = 0.08). This difference, -0.22,
95% CI [-0.43, -0.01], was also significant t(260) = -2.04, p = 0.042, and represented an
effect of d = -0.23. Table 6 shows a summary of both the independent t-test and the
paired t-test results. The analysis of the results showed that hypothesis four and five are
supported. Table 17 summarizes the two hypotheses subject of study one and the
conclusion of data analysis results relevant to each presented hypothesis.
Table 17: Study One and Hypotheses Support
Hypothesis

Data Analysis Results

H4: The greater the threat un-desirability,
the higher the protection motivation

Supported

H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the
higher the protection motivation

Partially Supported

5.1.5 Model Comparative Analysis
This study included the performance of a comparative analysis. The purpose of
this comparative analysis is to compare the traditional PMT model used in the context of
information security to the model presented by this research. The performance of the
traditional PMT model was measured by an instrument adopted from Johnston and
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Warkentin (2010). The traditional use of PMT measured the impact of threat and coping
appraisals on protection motivation. Threat vulnerability (Vul) and threat severity (Sev)
constructs measured threat appraisal (TA). Three items, TVul1, TVul2, and TVul2
measured threat vulnerability. Four items, TSev1, TSev2, TSev3, and TSev4 measured
threat severity. Response efficacy (RE) and self-efficacy (SE) constructs measured
coping appraisal (CA). Three items, RE1, RE2, and RE3 measured response efficacy
construct. Three items SEff1, SEff2, and SEff3 measured self-efficacy construct.
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to confirm the constructs
measures. The results are only presented for reflective constructs. Software used is
Smart-PLS version 3 (Ringle, 2015). The procedures used are partial least squares (PLS)
and PLS bootstrapping (5000 runs). A bootstrap sample size of 5000 is recommended
(Hair et al., 2011). The procedure of bootstrapping, which validates the model, involves
drawing a large number of subsamples from the original sample to allow the significance
of formative indicators’ coefficients to be tested (Hair et al., 2010). The outer loadings
were analyzed for all items measuring PMT constructs. All items showed high outer
loading scores and P-values confirmed statistical significance of all items. Table 18
shows the outer loadings results for all items used.
Table 18: CFA Outer Loadings for Items of the PMT Original Model
Items

Outer Loadings

T Statistics (|O/STDEV|)

P Values

PM1 <- PM

0.80*

34.71

0.00

PM2 <- PM

0.86*

46.09

0.00

PM3 <- PM

0.87*

67.42

0.00

PM4 <- PM

0.46*

8.10

0.00

PM5 <- PM

0.86*

61.03

0.00
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RE1 <- RE

0.90*

80.40

0.00

RE2 <- RE

0.93*

104.53

0.00

RE3 <- RE

0.89*

53.58

0.00

SEff1 <- SE

0.81*

35.11

0.00

SEff2 <- SE

0.90*

68.06

0.00

SEff3 <- SE

0.88*

62.19

0.00

TSev1 <- Sev

0.85*

62.55

0.00

TSev2 <- Sev

0.88*

102.97

0.00

TSev3 <- Sev

0.81*

34.87

0.00

TSev4 <- Sev

0.80*

30.06

0.00

TVul1 <- Vul

0.91*

77.49

0.00

TVul2 <- Vul

0.88*

66.12

0.00

TVul3 <- Vul

0.90*

70.43

0.00

*P < 0.05
Following the factor analysis and the outer loadings of construct items, constructs
reliability and validity was tested. The values for composite reliability, the Cronbach’s
Alpha, the average variance extracted (AVE), and discriminant validity were analyzed to
evaluate constructs reliability and validity. Table 19 shows the values for Cronbach’s
Alpha, AVE, and composite reliability. The discriminant validity test was performed and
the results was included in Table 19 as well.
Table 19: Constructs Reliability and Discriminant Validity for PMT Model

Cronbach's Composite
Alpha
Reliability

Average
Variance
Extracted
AVE
PM

PM

0.83

0.89

0.62

0.79

RE

0.89

0.93

0.81

0.41 0.90

SE

0.83

0.90

0.75

0.32 0.55

RE

SE

0.86

Sev

Vul
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Sev

0.85

0.90

0.69

0.24 0.22

0.22 0.83

Vul

0.88

0.92

0.80

0.11 0.08

0.11 0.56 0.90

Results analysis, as shown in the tables above support the reliability and validity
of the constructs used in the traditional PMT approach. We also performed the HTMT
test on the model. Table 20 summarizes the HTMT test results for the constructs. The
results show that all values are below the HTMT critical value, which confirms constructs
discriminant validity.
Table 20: HTMT Discriminant Validity Results for PMT Model
PM

RE

SE

RE

0.47

SE

0.38

0.64

Sev

0.30

0.27

0.27

Vul

0.14

0.09

0.13

Sev

0.63

Both models showed high scores while statistically significant. However, the
variance explained by each model varied significantly. Table 21 shows comparison of
the results for variance explained by each model.
Table 21: Variance Explained by Each Model
Research Model

PM

PMT Traditional Model

R Squared
Adjusted

Q Squared

R Squared
Adjusted

Q Squared

0.34

0.20

0.19

0.11

F Squared
(CF)

F Squared
(TuD)

F Squared
(CA)

F Squared
(TA)

0.10

0.34

0.19

0.02

Also, Figures 7 and 8 show each model scores when measured by Smart-PLS.
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TuD

Figure 7. Smart-PLS traditional PMT model illustration

0.185
TuD

Figure 8. Smart-PLS study one model illustration

94
The original PMT model predicts that the change in coping appraisal and threat
appraisal significantly influence protection motivation. The analysis of the results using
the traditional PMT model shows that while both constructs, coping appraisal and threat
appraisal, are statistically significant, coping appraisal has a moderate effect size of 0.19
and threat appraisal has a small effect size of 0.02. The analysis of the results also shows
that coping and threat appraisals in the model explain 19 % of the variance in protection
motivation. The model presented in this research predicts that change in coping
feasibility and threat un-desirability significantly influence protection motivation. The
analysis of the results for the model presented by this research shows that coping
feasibility has a moderate effect size while threat un-desirability has a large effect size of
0.34. The analysis of the results also shows that coping feasibility and threat undesirability explained 34% of the variance in protection motivation. The results show
that the model presented in this research offers a larger effect size with a much greater
explanatory power. This outcome supports the argument proposed in this research that
this model is able to apply PMT based on its original intent that requires the perception of
the threat to be on a personal level not against the organization. The data analysis of
study one supports that the decreased desirability of the threat and the increased
perception of the feasibility of the coping mechanism significantly influence protection
motivation.
5.2 Study Two Data Analysis
The objective of study two is to test the entire research model. The model
evaluates the impact of knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and finesse) on protection
motivation, while fully mediated by the individual’s affective perception of threat un-
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desirability and coping feasibility. Study two will implement a cross-sectional web-based
survey for data collection to test and measure the impact of all proposed research
hypotheses.
5.2.1 Sample Frame and Used Sample
The sample frame for study two included currently employed full-time business
professionals who use information systems for their daily jobs. The sample frame does
not include labor workers who do not use enterprise information systems daily to
accomplish their job-related tasks. The sample frame also does not include part-time,
retired professionals, IT professionals, or professionals from technology companies. A
professional company, Qualtrics, was contracted for the recruitment of participants and
the administration of the online survey.
The company was contacted to provide 200 complete and usable responses.
During the data collection process, a collaboration between the researcher and the
company was followed to make sure all responses matched the sample frame criteria.
The collaboration process included a soft launch to test the accuracy of the respondents
screening process. Following the soft launch, the process of the full data collection was
performed. During this process, the company provided a total of 247 responses. From
the total provided responses, 28 responses were removed for being incomplete,
inaccurate, or from respondents from technology companies. The total number of
responses used for the data analysis was 219 responses from a diverse sample of currently
employed full-time business professionals.
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5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
The used 219 usable responses included 75% females and 25% males. Almost all
of the participants, 98%, were older than were 21 years of age. About 60% of the
participants received a 4-year college degree or higher, 10% received an associate degree,
20% received some college education, and 10% received high school diploma. The
majority of the participants, 52%, have been with their current company 6 years or more,
42% have been with their company between 1 to 5 years, and only 6% have been with
their company for less than one year. Almost all of the participants, 97%, had some level
of familiarity with computers, including 54% were extremely familiar with computers.
Most of the participants, 81%, used computers all of the time to get their job tasks done.
Descriptive statistics details are included in Appendix D.
5.2.3 Changes from Study One
The key measures used in study two were refined based on the data analysis
performed in study one. Study one confirmed the use of most of the proposed key
measures for threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation.
However, the validity and reliability data analysis of the key measures supported the
removal of two items. Specifically, study two did not include TUDPD_Hypo3 and
TUDPD_Spat1. Also, study two included few refinements regarding terms used in the
survey questions. The term “distant” was replaced with “far away” in study two survey.
Additionally, the term “hypothetical” that was used in the instrument of study one was
changed to “speculative” in instrument used for study two. Finally, because the sample
frame of study two is different from the sample frame of study one, we included several
additional statistical controls. We also changed the way threat context was
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communicated to the participants. Study one presented to participating students two
concrete and abstract scenarios of specific threats. However, in study two, we asked the
participating employees to select from a list of threats the threat that employees have
heard about or have some experience with.
5.2.4 Statistical Controls
This study considered several control factors that could influence participants’
protection motivation. Similar to study one, participants’ gender, age, computer
experience, and risk appetite were used as statistical controls. In addition, the study
recognized that there are other statistical controls applicable to professionals that should
also be analyzed. These controls are participants’ industry type, department of work,
level of education, years of work experience with current organization, and the level of
technology use on the job. Consequently, we included these demographics
characteristics as baseline statistical controls. Among all statistical controls, only
computer experience and level of technology use were found to be statistically
significant. To arrive at the optimal control variable model, the non-significant statistical
controls were removed. The analysis of the control variables reveals that the level of
computer experience and the level of technology use to perform work related duties
impact protection motivation. Those two statistically significant controls accounted for
0.04 change in the independent variable. Table 22 shows the statistical significance and
the impact of the control variables.
Table 22: Control Variables Statistics
Control Factors

Factor
Loading

T Statistics

P Values
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Age

-0.22

0.734

0.231

Computer
Experience*

0.797

2.891

0.002

Department

0.146

0.443

0.329

Education

0.189

0.744

0.228

Experience

-0.073

0.248

0.402

Gender

0.076

0.286

0.387

Industry

-0.22

0.721

0.235

Technology Use*

0.707

2.309

0.01

Risk Appetite

0.03

0.47

0.32

PM Adjusted R-Square = 0.04
*P > 0.05
5.2.5 Construct Validity and Reliability
The validity and reliability of all constructs used in this study was tested. This
study included constructs measuring the dimensions of knowledge, knowledge breadth
(KB), knowledge depth (KD), and knowledge finesse (KF). It also included threat undesirability (TuD), coping feasibility (CF), and protection motivation (PM). Knowledge
dimensions constructs KB, KD, and KF were measured by three items respectively
labeled (KB1, KB2, KB3), (KD1, KD2, KD3), and (KF1, KF2, KF3). The remaining
constructs – threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation measures
followed the items confirmed by study one. Table 23 shows the constructs loading
scores.
Table 23: Items loadings with T-statistics and P-values (CFA)
Items Loadings

T Statistics (|O/STDEV|)

P Values

Hypo1 <- Hypo*

0.85

29.33

0.00

Hypo2 <- Hypo*

0.86

36.68

0.00
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Hypo3 <- Hypo*

0.28

2.01

0.02

KB_1 <- KB*

0.93

43.14

0.00

KB_2 <- KB*

0.96

97.18

0.00

KB_3 <- KB*

0.95

88.04

0.00

KD_1 <- KD*

0.95

88.95

0.00

KD_2 <- KD*

0.94

67.64

0.00

KD_3 <- KD*

0.93

62.54

0.00

KF_1 <- KF*

0.96

109.75

0.00

KF_2 <- KF*

0.96

148.38

0.00

KF_3 <- KF*

0.91

55.63

0.00

PM1 <- PM*

0.82

22.54

0.00

PM2 <- PM*

0.84

34.98

0.00

PM3 <- PM*

0.79

17.08

0.00

PM4 <- PM*

0.87

39.29

0.00

PM5 <- PM*

0.87

39.70

0.00

RD1 <- RD*

0.92

63.45

0.00

RD2 <- RD*

0.93

66.28

0.00

RD3 <- RD*

0.90

39.02

0.00

RE1 <- RE*

0.90

49.59

0.00

RE2 <- RE*

0.93

75.50

0.00

RE3 <- RE*

0.90

49.85

0.00

Soci1 <- Soci*

0.69

10.60

0.00

Soci2 <- Soci*

0.83

27.76

0.00

Soci3 <- Soci*

0.88

62.91

0.00

Spat1 <- Spat*

0.40

3.28

0.00

Spat2 <- Spat*

0.85

42.47

0.00

Spat3 <- Spat*

0.85

31.53

0.00

Temp1 <- Temp*

0.73

11.91

0.00

Temp2 <- Temp*

0.73

15.94

0.00

Temp3 <- Temp*

0.82

27.77

0.00
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*P < 0.05
As shown in table 23, all knowledge dimension items for KB, KD, and KF
returned high loading scores. Also the loadings of all other remaining items for PM, the
four dimensions of TuD (Temp, Soci, Spat, and Hypo), and the two dimensions of CF
(RD and RE) all showed high loading scores consistent with study one. The table also
show that all items were statistically significant with all P-Values less than 0.05.
Following the analysis of outer loadings, each construct reliability and validity
was tested. The values for composite reliability, the Cronbach’s Alpha, the average
variance extracted (AVE), and discriminant validity were checked to evaluate constructs
reliability and validity. Table 24 shows the values for Cronbach’s Alpha, AVE, and
composite reliability. The discriminant validity test was performed and results were
included in Table 24 as well. The results of the discriminant validity, the diagonal values
in boldface in the table, were greater than any of the internal factors correlations (or
correlations of the constructs) for all constructs. All AVE and composite reliability
values are indications of conversion validity. Also all Cronbach’s Alpha values are high.
Although the Cronbach’s Alpha scores for the construct measuring psychological
distance to threat un-desirability were slightly lower than 0.7, all other scores for these
constructs such as loadings, composite reliability, AVE, and discriminant validity are
high.
Table 24: Construct Reliability and Validity
α

Composite
Reliability

AVE

Hypo

Hypo

0.67

0.86

0.75

0.87

KB

0.94

0.96

0.89

0.23

0.94

KD

0.93

0.96

0.88

0.20

0.80

KB

KD

0.94

KF

PM

RD

RE

Soci

Spat

Temp
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KF

0.94

0.96

0.89

0.00

0.49

0.55

0.94

PM

0.90

0.92

0.70

0.48

0.42

0.42

0.22

0.84

RD

0.91

0.94

0.84

-0.01

0.06

0.10

0.36

-0.11

0.92

RE

0.90

0.94

0.83

0.37

0.52

0.49

0.35

0.52

-0.06

0.91

Soci

0.73

0.85

0.65

0.61

0.15

0.13

0.06

0.26

0.21

0.23

0.81

Spat

0.62

0.84

0.72

0.66

0.26

0.21

0.06

0.41

0.09

0.32

0.74

0.85

Temp

0.64

0.80

0.58

0.68

0.20

0.21

0.05

0.45

0.12

0.36

0.66

0.68

0.76

We also performed the HTMT discriminant validity test. The KB, KD, KF, RD,
RE, and PM constructs values were below the HTMT critical values confirming
discriminant validity. In addition, as expected with the psychological distance constructs,
some of the values were slightly above the HTMT critical value. Because these are
formative constructs and are expected to have cross loadings. These results were
consistent with study one. Table 25 summarizes the HTMT test results.
Table 25: HTMT Discriminant Validity Test
Hypo

KB

KD

KF

PM

RD

RE

Soci Spat

KB

0.28

KD

0.26

0.85

KF

0.09

0.53 0.59

PM

0.63

0.46 0.45 0.24

RD

0.12

0.07 0.11 0.39 0.12

RE

0.48

0.56 0.54 0.38 0.58 0.07

Soci

0.87

0.17 0.15 0.08 0.32 0.26 0.29

Spat

1.03

0.33 0.27 0.14 0.55 0.15 0.42 1.07

Temp

1.03

0.24 0.27 0.11 0.59 0.21 0.46 0.95 1.05

5.2.6 Model Testing
Using the established controlled model, the effects of knowledge dimensions on
the perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility were tested. Similarly, the
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effects of threat undesirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation were
tested. Table 26 shows the statistical significance and the total effects of each construct
in the model.
Table 26: Total Effects of Model Constructs
Original Sample (O)

T Statistics (|O/STDEV|)

P Values

CF -> PM*

0.34

4.32

0.00

KB -> PM*

0.11

2.91

0.00

KB -> TuD*

0.27

3.55

0.00

KD -> CF*

0.41

5.43

0.00

KD -> PM*

0.14

3.17

0.00

KF -> CF*

0.18

1.70

0.04

KF -> PM*

0.06

1.61

0.05

TuD -> PM*

0.41

6.18

0.00

*P < 0.05
As shown in the table, the results indicated that knowledge breadth was
significant in influencing the perception of threat un-desirability. In addition, both
knowledge depth and knowledge finesse were significant in their influence on the
perception of coping feasibility. Consistent with study one, both threat un-desirability
and coping feasibility significantly influenced protection motivation. Although the
impact of coping feasibility on PM was significant, the path analysis of one of its
formative constructs, RD, was not significant. Although RD is theoretically grounded
and its factor analysis was significant with p-value less than 0.005, it did not provide
significant impact towards CF. To further understand this outcome, we looked at studies
addressing task complexity as it relates to RD. Gill and Hicks (2006) explained that task
complexity contains four other views in addition to the psychological state or individual
perception. The other views of task complexity are information processing, structure,
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problem space, and task characteristics. Therefore, future research should be continue to
explore the impact of the other four views on CF.
Table 27 shows the variance explained by the research model. The analysis of the
results using the research model show that knowledge breadth has a small effect size on
threat un-desirability. Similarly knowledge fenisse has a small effect size on coping
feasibility while knowledge depth has a moderate effect size on coping feasibility.
Results show that both constructs, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, each has a
moderate effect size of 0.23 and 0.16 respectively. The analysis of the results also shows
that threat un-desirability and coping feasibility in the model account for 39 % of the
variance in protection motivation.
Table 27: Variance Explained by the Research Model
PM

TuD

CF

R Square
Adjusted

Q
Squared

R Square
Adjusted

Q
Squared

R Square
Adjusted

Q
Squared

0.39

0.25

0.07

0.04

0.27

0.13

F Square
(TuD)

F Square
(CF)

F Square
(KB)

F Square
(KD)

F Square
(KF)

0.23

0.16

0.08

0.16

0.03

The test of the research model indicated that the model fit (SRMR) value is 0.088.
The fit scores, as well as the adjusted R square and the p-values, show that the model is
significantly improved and capable of predicting a statistically significant influence of
threat un-desirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation. These findings
suggest that knowledge dimensions can form the personal perception of threat undesirability and coping feasibility, which in turn are sufficient and significant to influence
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the motivation to protect information. Figure 9 shows the path coefficients and the
statistical significance of model’s constructs.

Figure 9. Model path coefficients and significance
The analysis of the results show that all proposed hypotheses are supported.
Table 28 summarizes all hypotheses presented by this research and the conclusion of data
analysis results relevant to each presented hypothesis.
Table 28: Research Hypotheses and Results Support for Study Two
Hypothesis

Data Analysis Results

H1: The greater the breadth of
knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the
greater the un-desirability of the threat by
end-users

Supported

H2: The greater the depth of
knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the
higher the coping feasibility

Supported
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H3: The greater the finesse, the
higher the coping feasibility

Supported

H4: The greater the threat undesirability, the higher the protection
motivation

Supported

H5: The greater the coping
feasibility, the higher the protection
motivation

Supported

CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION
This chapter discusses interpretation of the results, limitations, contributions, and
future research directions. The chapter starts with the discussion of the data results and
its support to the research objectives and the proposed hypotheses. Following the results
discussion, we address research limitations and the way these limitations were addressed.
We then explain the research contributions to scholarly academic researchers and to
practitioners based on data findings and the supported hypotheses. We will explain how
these findings contribute to further the work of academicians and practitioners. We
follow by discussing future directions of information systems research in the context of
information security. Finally, we finish with our conclusion from this research.
6.1 Interpretation of Results
This research sought to understand the way knowledge mechanisms, such as
SETA and security policies, influence employees’ secure behavior in a particular threat
context. Threat context represented the events or conditions that expose information
systems to potential threats. The research conceptualized knowledge mechanism across
three dimensions: breadth, depth, and finesse. The research also conceptualized the
psychological process, to preserve the intent of PMT, based on the threat un-desirability
and coping feasibility. The four dimensions of the psychological distance, temporal,
social, spatial, and hypothetical dimensions, formed the threat un-desirability higher
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order construct (HOC). Similarly, response difficulty and response efficacy formed the
coping feasibility HOC.
6.1.1 Study One Findings
Study one measured how individuals’ psychological distance from a specific
threat forms the perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. The
psychological distance from the threat was manipulated in terms of the concreteness or
abstractness of a specific threat context. The study also measured the impact of threat undesirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation. Results show that the
concreteness or abstractness of a threat context actually creates a significant difference in
individuals’ perception regarding threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. Results
also show that threat un-desirability and coping feasibility significantly influence
protection motivation.
We found that the abstractness or concreteness of a threat context cause change in
the perception of threat un-desirability. That change was significant across all four
psychological dimensions. As we argued, grounded by CLT, that variation along any
dimension of psychological distance influenced the perception of threat un-desirability.
The concrete threat context, manipulated across all four dimensions, increased the
perception of threat un-desirability. The change was consistent when compared the
results within a group or between the two groups. This supports the idea that the undesirability of the threat will increase when individuals perceive the threat on a closer
psychological distance. This is consistent with the original intent of PMT. Therefore, as
we proposed, the affective perception of threat un-desirability will preserve the original
intent of PMT in the context of information security.
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An interesting finding related to the hypothetical dimension of the psychological
distance is worth mentioning. The results of the hypothetical dimension were statistically
significant with high scores for reliability and validity. However, we found that this
psychological dimension provided slightly lower contribution to the change in the HOC,
threat un-desirability, compared to the other three dimensions of the psychological
distance. We interpreted this to be due to the difficulty of manipulating a true and
popular information security threat as hypothetical threat that is less likely to happen.
The application of this finding will be addressed in more details in the implication
section.
Findings regarding coping feasibility showed different results within groups as
compared to between groups. The change in coping feasibility was not significant within
each group when the threat context was presented in two sequential events alternating
abstractness and concreteness of threat context. We interpreted this to be a result of the
learning experience. Once a group receives knowledge about a threat and its mitigating
action, whether in concrete or abstract fashion, any subsequent communication will
provide additional knowledge, and the perception of the coping feasibility change will
not be statistically significant. In contrast, there was a significant change in the
perception of coping feasibility between groups. When we simultaneously presented an
abstract threat context to one group and a concrete threat context to another group and
compared the results, we found significant change in perception regarding coping
feasibility between the two groups. The group that received concrete threat context
showed higher scores for the coping feasibility HOC compared to the group that received
an abstract context. This outcome supported our argument that the perception of the
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coping feasibility will increase when an individual receives concrete knowledge about the
context of that threat.
Participants in both groups showed positive change in their protection motivation
when they received knowledge about information security threat. Results showed that
the positive change in protection motivation was significantly higher for the participants
of the group that received a concrete scenario compared to the group that received an
abstract threat. The results showed that coping feasibility and threat un-desirability
positively influence protection motivation. We found that as the perception of the threat
un-desirability increases, the more motivated the individual would be to follow secure
behavior. Similarly, we found that as the perception of the coping feasibility increases,
the more motivated the individual would be to follow secure behavior. However, the
results supported that threat un-desirability has the larger impact on protection
motivation. Thus, this is consistent with our argument that despite the importance of
cognition, behavioral drivers are affective.
In conclusion, the findings from study one supported that concreteness or
abstractness of threat context will actually influence the perception of threat undesirability and coping feasibility. The concreteness of the threat context will increase
the perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. In addition, results support
the positive impact of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility on protection
motivation.
6.1.2 Study Two Findings
Study two measured the impact of knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and
finesse) on protection motivation, while fully mediated by the employees’ affective
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perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. The results show support to
the proposed positive impact of knowledge dimensions on the perception of threat undesirability and coping feasibility. Similarly, results support the positive impact of threat
undesirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation.
We found that knowledge breadth was significant in influencing the perception of
threat un-desirability. The variety of knowledge provide broader understanding of the
threat context. Breadth of knowledge will explain information security threats from
external hackers, competitors, and natural disasters, as well as the internal threats caused
by employees’ behavior, whether malicious or accidental. The breadth of knowledge
increase employees’ abilities to recognize from a personal perspective the range of threats
and associate security risks that employees my face during their daily responsibilities.
The personal understanding of the damaging details of the threat will increase threat undesirability. Therefore, as proposed, breadth of knowledge provided a significant
positive influence on the employees’ perception of threat un-desirability.
We also found that both knowledge depth and knowledge finesse were significant
in their influence on the perception of coping feasibility. Understanding the details in
depth about the available course of action will increase coping feasibility. The
contribution of both completeness of knowledge about a threat and the ability to apply
innovativeness and creativity positively affect the perception of the feasibility of the
coping mechanism. The understanding of the complete steps needed to address any
threat in a specific context while allowing employees to contribute with experience and
creativity will reduce the perception of response difficulty and increased the perception of
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response efficacy. Therefore, both knowledge depth and finesse was found to positively
influence coping feasibility.
Consistent with study one, we found that both threat un-desirability and coping
feasibility significantly influenced protection motivation. Results show that threat undesirability and coping feasibility provided significant positive influence on protection
motivation. Therefore, we conclude that all proposed hypotheses of knowledge
dimensions are supported. Knowledge breadth, depth and finesse are key factors in
forming the personal perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, which in
turn are sufficient and significant to influence the motivation to protect information.
6.2 Limitations
We acknowledge the limitations that faced this research. Study one faced
limitations due to the use of the experimental design and the sample representativeness.
In addition, study one faced limitation due to the failure to manipulate response difficulty
among participants. Study one was an experiment with university students conducted to
understand perceptions toward information security threats. The use of an experiment
with students presents concerns about the external validity of the study and the use of
students to represent employees’ responses. Similarly, some limitations also apply to
study two. Study two followed a cross-sectional web-based survey for data collection.
The limitations of study two were associated with the use of a survey instrument, which
presents concerns regarding internal validity and reliability of results. The following
section explains how we addressed these limitations.
Conducting an experiment with students could present a limitation to the
generalizability of the study and extending its conclusions to employees. However,
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research supported the use of students in the context of information security as a reliable
sampling frame. Students are members of an organization with valuable information
assets and are subject to protection motivation factors similar to any system user
(Warkentin et al., 2016). We accepted these limitations, as the literature supports the use
of students as a reliable sample frame. Additionally, we were able to overcome the
limitation of sample representativeness by presenting students with realistic information
security threats relevant to university students. This allowed students to become
information systems end users who have valuable information that should be protected.
Therefore, the results were realistic and represented accurate useful measures of
perceptions, and not just a proxy to professionals.
Another external validity concern may come from how realistic the manipulations
of the experiment were in creating situations comparable to situations that employees
may encounter in their organizations. To increase the realistic perception of the
experiment manipulations, study one was designed to present several situations that
students may encounter in their daily routines similar to what the employees may
encounter in work environment. Study one required the communication of abstract and
concrete realistic threat scenarios to construe threat perception on a higher or lower
psychological distance from the end user. Using multiple threat scenarios allowed the
study to overcome this concern. Covering multiple threat contexts between two groups
of students allowed the study to measure the impact of a realistic threat context on
participants’ affective perception of that threat’s un-desirability and coping feasibility.
Only the manipulation of response difficulty was not successful. We found that response
difficulty is a complex construct with different facets that can contribute to the perception
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of response difficulty. We acknowledge this limitation and encourage future research to
explore facets of task complexity.
In conclusion, the experiment with students conducted in study one presented
some limitations. However, these limitations are not different from any other research
method. Also, many research studies used experiments when a convenience sample is
possible with naturally formed groups such as students in a classroom (Creswell, 2014).
Experiment, like the other methods, has several advantages. One of the most important
of these advantages is the strength of internal validity of results. Therefore, experiments
provide a powerful measurement with strong internal validity when used appropriately
(S. Gupta, 2006; Poole & DeSanctis, 2004).
Limitations that faced study two were associated with the use of a survey
instrument. The limitations here are similar to any study utilizing surveys for data
collection and analysis. Surveys present concerns regarding internal validity and
reliability of results. This stems from concerns regarding key measures, as well as a lack
of consistency or accuracy in the provided responses. To mitigate the concerns regarding
key measures, study two utilized validated measures used in prior literature. Also, study
two followed scientific statistical processes to confirm constructs validity and reliability.
The study also included several statistical controls to eliminate factors that might offer
competing external explanations.
Study two followed the recommended survey structure and length as explained by
Hair et al. (2010), to enable accurate and consistent responses. Also, the study followed
strict criteria to eliminate incomplete or inaccurate responses. Finally, to complete the
data collection from a wide range of professionals, we contracted a professional company
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to distribute the survey and collect the responses. Although this decision may cause a
concern regarding the researchers’ control over the sample and the collected responses,
this approach is supported in the literature. Further, the benefits of using professional
survey provider was extensively discussed and explained (Creswell, 2014; Sue & Ritter,
2007). Additionally, we provided to the contracted company a specific sample frame and
response collection criteria. The contracted data collection company provided the
researchers full access to the process to verify the sample frame and responses quality.
We rejected any responses that did not perfectly match the sample frame or did not meet
the response quality criteria. Literature supports the use of surveys, as they offer
economical access to large cross-sectional participants from the desired sample frame,
which increases the statistical power (Creswell, 2014).
All limitations were accepted and addressed appropriately. In addition, these
limitations can be viewed as opportunities for future research. Some of these
opportunities for future research will be discussed in a subsequent section.
6.3 Contribution
This research presented a theoretically grounded model that addresses current
gaps in the information security literature. The information security literature did not
explicitly leverage knowledge dimensions. We developed a unique study in the context
of information security to measure the impact of knowledge dimensions on affective
perception of security threats. The research offers greater understanding of how
knowledge dimensions influence employees’ psychological state to motivate compliance.
The model presented in this research explains various application of knowledge
dimensions in SETA programs and information security policies. Understanding the

115
unique outcomes to each of the knowledge dimensions provide strategies regarding the
use of knowledge mechanisms in the context of information security.
Business experts advise that organizations should stay current and expand their
abilities to provide information security insights regarding broader security threats, as
well as security threats that are specific to the organization and its environment
(Accenture, 2018). This research presents a supported scientific approach to enable
organizations to provide either broader or more specific information security insights.
This research explains the strategic applications of knowledge dimensions, breadth,
depth, and finesse. Breadth of knowledge can address the broader security threats that
any employee or organization could face. At the same time, the model also explains how
depth and finesse of knowledge can provide the needed accurate insights regarding
specific organizational security threats.
The breadth of knowledge brings the personal perspective to information security
threats. It enables organizations to provide insights regarding security threats, not only to
protect the organization, but also to protect the employees themselves. Employees will
understand the common threats that any business environment with digital assets may
face. Our results support that breadth of knowledge will provide the needed perspective
to keep employees vigilant regarding wide range security threats otherwise would be
perceived irrelevant. It illustrates threats on a personal level as it becomes relevant to
each employee and their line of business. Breadth of knowledge will allow employees to
understand the degree of harm associated with security threats, which influence
employees to see security threats as personal threats not as someone else’s problem. The
broader understanding of information security threats will enable employees to connect
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the new and evolving threats with the existing and known information security threats.
Breadth of knowledge will prevent the false sense of invulnerability and will motivate
employees to follow secure behavior as their personal behavioral choice.
Our results also supports that depth and finesse of knowledge will increase the
perception of response feasibility. Depth of knowledge provides understanding to actual
and specific threats. That will reduce mistakes and will enable fast and accurate secure
behavior to prevent or mitigate specific threatening situations. Depth of knowledge will
increase the feasibility of security requirements. Because such deep understanding will
reduce the conflict between security demands and job requirements. Depth of knowledge
will support employees to perform their daily assignments while following secure
behavior. Finesse allows the applications of comprehension and understanding of
security threats gained from historical events and prior experiences to mitigate security
incidents. Information security threats are increasing and advancing. Utilizing
knowledge dimensions enables organizations to take a more effective approach to
mitigate the increasingly diverse and sophisticated information security threats.
This research also provides a practical business approach to a traditionally
technical topic. The application of knowledge across these three dimensions will help
provide guidelines that are more specific to practitioners. Each industry faces different
threats, and successful security countermeasures come from understanding these industry
specific threats (Verizon, 2018). Therefore, the generic “one-size-fits-all” approaches are
ineffective, especially with ambiguous or unknown security threats. This research shows
the way to clarify threat contexts and the circumstances that may influence employees’
psychological state. Our model can inform organizational leaders and allow them to

117
create policies and SETA programs tailored to employees’ specific domains and level of
knowledge. Knowledge dimensions will provide strategic understanding to inform the
construction of security policies and SETA programs. Organizational leaders can design
security policies and SETA programs with feasibility and on a personal level. The model
explains the use of knowledge dimensions to focus employees’ perceptions on response
feasibility and threat un-desirability. The model allows the creation of feasible and
desirable security strategies that are generalizable across different known threats as well
as new threats that may emerge.
This research provides greater understanding regarding the impact of the various
dimensions of knowledge. Understanding the influence of the breadth, depth, and finesse
of knowledge on employees’ perception allows managers to create security policies and
SETA programs that align business goals and security requirements. Breadth of
knowledge can reduce accidental security threats. It provides broader understanding that
allows employees to understand security threats relevant to their daily and personal
activities. Knowledge depth increases the accuracy of response implementation and
motivates secure behavior. Finesse is a dimension of knowledge that has not been
considered in the context of information security. Organizations often limit employees’
ability to implement finesse in their response to mitigate a threat. This research provides
support to the proposed positive impact of finesse dimension of knowledge. We provide
a unique contribution to allow organizations to recognize the potential of this untapped
dimension of knowledge. The mining of employees’ insights can improve the way
organizations evaluate feasibility of responses to security threats. Allowing employees to
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collaborate and brainstorm will positively influence the perception of the feasibility of
secure behaviors.
This research offers noteworthy contributions to the literature. The research
contributes by providing a more improved model of information security. The research
model shows how to influence protection motivation in a way that limits results
variations and allows PMT to work as designed in the context of information security.
We also provide a theoretically driven re-conceptualization of PMT’s constructs to
preserve its intent. The conceptualization of PMT’s constructs was accomplished by the
application of CLT to explain employees’ psychological process. CLT explained the way
individuals will construe information security threats on a personal level. We were able
to influence greater change in protection motivation by directing employees’ perception
to threat un-desirability and coping feasibility. Such a re-conceptualization of PMT’s
constructs allows the presentation of information security threats on a personal level.
The original context of PMT refers to a threat appraisal as the individuals’
assessment of their own safety if they follow a certain behavior (Maddux & Rogers,
1983). However, the applications of PMT in the context of information security
measured threat appraisal by how well an individual understands organizational threat,
not personal safety. The position of the threat was removed from a personal threat and
became an organizational threat. Threat un-desirability differs from threat appraisal in
the context of information security. Threat un-desirability refers to the extent to which an
individual will perceive a personal impact by the threat. The perception of the threat is
based on the individual’s psychological distance from the threat. Therefore, threat undesirability re-conceptualizes PMT’s threat appraisal in the context of information
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security to preserve the original intent of the theory and places the locus on the
individual.
Similarly, the re-conceptualization of coping feasibility refers to the process by
which individuals evaluate the effectiveness of the available risk mitigating behavior.
Feasibility consideration focuses on the level of difficulty regarding the mitigating action.
The model presented in this research shows that the increased knowledge depth and
finesse will direct employees’ perceptions towards the feasibility of the response
mechanism. The locus of coping appraisal is the task to be performed by the individual.
The locus of coping feasibility is the individual. Coping feasibility is concerned with the
individual’s perception of the ease (difficulty) in performing an action. Therefore, threat
desirability re-conceptualizes the PMT’s coping appraisal in the context of information
security by focusing individuals’ perception on the response appraisal from the feasibility
perspective (response feasibility).
The research presents a theoretically grounded model that allows PMT to explain
the psychological process of protection motivation. This model extends the theory while
preserving its original intent that requires the perception of the threat to be on a personal
level and not against the organization. The model offers a larger effect size with a much
greater explanatory power.
This research provides a generalizable business approach for any incident-driven
behavior that was typically viewed as a technical topic. The presented model allows the
research to be generalizable across different known threats, as well as new threats that
may emerge. The approach presented in this research focused on understanding the
psychological process of any threat context, whether the threat is external, internal,
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malicious, or accidental. The context of the threat could be known and addressed by the
organization, known but not addressed yet in organizational policies, or unknown and
ambiguous. Context of information security threats clarify threatening circumstances and
influence perception. The context of information security threats enable employees to
distinguish between threats and follow secure behavior.
6.4 Future Research Directions
This research explored the impact of coping feasibility on protection motivation.
The HOC was formed by response efficacy and response difficulty. We found that
response difficulty is a multi-faceted construct. The literature shows that information
processing, structure, problem space, and task characteristics are different facets that can
contribute to the perception of task complexity (Gill & Hicks, 2006). Therefore, future
research should continue to explore the impact of the other dimensions of task
complexity on coping feasibility.
This study provides a reconceptualization to the psychological process of PMT.
One of our objectives was to increase the generalizability of the model. The study
focused on the affective attributes as the main drivers of behavior. The different
components of PMT were conceptualized at different levels, i.e. task / context and
individual. Such re-conceptualization extends the opportunity for researchers to use the
re-conceptualized constructs of PMT in different domains beyond information security.
This generalizable approach presents opportunities for future research to study persuasive
communications for any incident-driven behavior, including PMT’s original domain.
Furthermore, we presented the influence of knowledge dimensions on protection
motivation. Previous research discussed the importance of the comprehensiveness of
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knowledge in information security policies and SETA programs without explaining
whether that means depth, breadth, or finesse of knowledge. This research presented
support to the specific impact of the three knowledge dimensions of breadth, depth, and
finesse on the perception in terms of un-desirability and feasibility. Researchers may
pursue the application of this research model in a more specific approach. Therefore,
future research may study content design and structure of policy or SETA programs in
light of these specific knowledge dimensions.
6.5 Conclusion
This research presented a theoretically grounded model to understand how
knowledge mechanisms such as policies and SETA programs influence employees’
secure behavior in a particular threat context. The research model addressed several gaps
in information security literature. Information security literature did not explicitly
leverage knowledge dimensions. The model presented in this research explains various
application of knowledge dimensions breadth, depth, and finesse in SETA programs and
information security policies. In addition, the conventional application of PMT in the
field of information security caused inconsistent and conflicting results. The research
presents an improved model that preserves the original intent of PMT in the context
information security to limit the variation of results. Finally, the research presented a
generalizable approach for any incident-driven behavior and a practical business
approach to a traditionally technical topic.
To support the proposed hypotheses and to test the research model, this research
applied quantitative methods and examined the relationships between variables to address
the research questions. The research empirically tested the model using two-study
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approach. The first study was a scenario-based experiment with 262 students. The
experiment understood key psychological processes of threat perception. The second
study empirically validated the entire theoretical model. We surveyed 219 employees
across the organization with varied responsibilities and technical competence. We tested
the theoretical model using structural equation modeling (SEM) approach.
Results show support to our proposal that the psychological distance from the
threat allows employees to perceive the personal impact of the threat. When threat
context was constructed on a closer psychological distance, the perception of threat undesirability and coping feasibility increased. Results support that the key psychological
constructs, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, influence employees behavioral
choices. Threat un-desirability focuses employees’ perception on un-desirable harmful
outcomes of information security threats, while coping feasibility considerations direct
employees’ perceptions towards action alternatives to protect the information. Threat undesirability and coping feasibility showed significant positive impact on protection
motivation.
Finally, this research study provided several contributions and set directions for
future research. This research provided an improved model that explained protection
motivation. The research proposed an approach to limit PMT results’ variations in the
context of information security. Additionally, the study offered practitioners a business
approach to a traditionally technical topic and researchers a generalized model to address
known threats as well as new threats that may emerge.
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Protection Motivation
Items to measure protection motivation by Posey et al. (2015):
1. I am motivated to protect my information from its security threats.
2. My intentions to prevent my information security threats from being successful
are high.
3. It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information and
information systems from security threats.
Modified Protection Motivation Items
1. I am motivated to protect my information / information systems from security
threats now.
2. It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information / information
systems from security threats immediately.
3. I have high intentions to prevent security threats from being successful.
4. I predict that I will immediately protect my information / information systems
from security threats.
5. I intend to promptly protect my information / information systems from
information security threats.
Risk Propensity
Scale to measure risk propensity (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995):
Participants will be asked: “when you face a decision that affects you, how would you
rate your tendency to (1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely). . .
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1. Choose more or less risky alternatives based on the assessment of others on whom
you must rely
2. Choose more or less risky alternatives which rely upon analyses high in technical
complexity
3. Choose more or less risky alternatives which could have a major impact on you
4. Initiate a strategic action which has the potential to backfire
5. Support a decision when I am aware that relevant analyses were done while
missing several pieces of information
Comparative Analysis
The following instruments for threat and coping appraisals are adopted from
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) will be used for comparative analysis to show different in
impact between the traditional use of PMT in the context of information security and the
newly created instrument for psychological process manipulations. The following items
will be used to measure threat appraisal.
1. My computer is at risk for becoming infected with malware.
2. It is likely that my computer will become infected with malware.
3. It is possible that my computer will become infected with malware.
The following items will be used to measure coping appraisal:
1. Anti-malware software is easy to use.
2. Anti-malware software is convenient to use.
3. I am able to use anti-malware software without much effort.
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All items were measured using 7-point Likert-type scales from 1 = strongly disagree to 7
= strongly agree.
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Group 1 Concrete Scenario
You are a College of Business university student. This is the last week of classes and
finals are next week. You are currently enrolled in a capstone project class. All students
must successfully complete this class in order to graduate. The deadline for the complete
project submission is in two days.
Today you just learned about what happened to a close friend of yours who is also
finishing the capstone project. Last night as your friend was doing some last-minute
internet research, his / her computer was suddenly locked. A message on the computer
told your friend to pay $2000.00 to unlock the computer. Without unlocking the
computer, your friend is unlikely to be able to finish the project and graduate. You are in
the middle of the same project with some internet research left to do.
The university utilizes its official email system and its secure learning portal to
communicate mitigating actions and periodically directs students’ attention to avoid
various malicious security threats such as this one. The university suggests the following
actions to protect oneself from this specific threat:


Don’t visit or download materials from untrusted websites



Make sure your anti-malware/antivirus is up-to-date



Backup critical files using cloud storage



When suspicious view training videos or contact the university information
security office for immediate help

Training is always available online in the university’s website and in the designated IT
training location across campus, or by phone using the university’s security hotline.
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Table 29 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented in
the concrete scenario.
Table 29: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Concrete Version of
Scenario 1
Dimension

Scenario terms

Distance

Temporal

Events are current as indicated by:
today, two days, and next week

Low

Spatial

Events are in the student’s college
and class

Low

Social

Events happening to the
participant and participant’s close
friend

Low

Hypothetical

True event happened last night

Low

Group 1 Abstract Scenario
You are a College of Business university student. Next year you may plan to
register for the capstone project class. It is optional for students to complete the capstone
project class before graduation. If you choose to enroll, the deadline for the capstone
project will be at the end of next year.
As you work on researching for your project, you remember having heard a story
some time ago about something happened to a large corporation. What might have
happened was that an employee of a company was doing some internet research when the
company’s computer that the employee was using was suddenly locked. A message on
the computer told the employee that his/her company needed to pay money to unlock the
computer. Without unlocking the computer, the company was unlikely to be able to gain
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access to files on this computer. Next year, if you are in the capstone project, you may
need to do some internet search for the project work.
The university offers general guidelines to increase students’ awareness about
potential malicious software. The university does not communicate specific actions
about information security threats that external companies may deal with, as this threat
may not target students. The university suggests reading their monthly information
security newsletter to be familiar with current information security events. The
university relies on students to use their discretion when it comes to protecting
themselves from security threats.
Table 30 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented
in the abstract scenario.
Table 30: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Abstract Version of
Scenario 1
Dimension

Scenario terms

Distance

Temporal

Events are in the future or
happened in the past: next year,
long ago

High

Spatial

Events are in an organization
somewhere else

High

Social

Events happening to random
person (an employee in an
organization)

High

Hypothetical

Maybe the event night have
happened

High
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Group 2 Concrete Scenario
You are a College of Business university student. Today, your close friend and classmate
told you what just happened to him. This morning he received the following email:
You are receiving this email because you have authorized the university payroll to
pay you through direct deposit. Due to recent system update, your direct deposit
routing and account numbers will need to be updated by Friday. Failure to do so
will stop the direct deposit access. Any unprocessed payments will be deferred to
the following pay cycle. For timely payments and successful direct deposit of
your paycheck, please make sure your direct deposit information are updated
immediately.
To update your direct deposit information please click on the link below and
verify account information.
https://payroll.update-direct-deposite.edu
Remember to save your current information once update is complete.
Thank you.
Payroll Team
He receives a paycheck every two weeks because he is a student worker at the college of
business. As instructed, he followed the directions. Few hours later, he received a bank
notification regarding an overdraft charge. When he inquired, he found out that his
account was accessed this morning and his current balance is $0.00. The transaction
timestamp shows that the activity took place soon after he updated the direct deposit
information. Your friend was a phishing victim.
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Typical phishing message always claim to be from a recognized source and ask to
verify your information. It also contains a link to redirect the user to a specific website
where they can collect the needed personal information. To protect against this type of
scam, your organization created policies that prohibit the communication of any financial
information via email. Your organization also provides an ongoing security awareness
training that, among other things, explains how to detect such attack and discourages
users from communicating sensitive personal or corporate information. Also your
organization created a two-step verification where the organization will send you a code
then this code will be used to get to the login page.
Table 31 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented
in the concrete version of scenario 2.
Table 31: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Concrete Version of
Scenario 2
Dimension

Scenario terms

Distance

Temporal

Events are current as indicated by:
today, this morning, and few hours
later

Low

Spatial

Events are in the student’s college
and class

Low

Social

Events happening to the
participant’s close friend

Low

Hypothetical

True event happened this morning

Low

Group 2 Abstract Scenario
Last year you heard a story about a worker at a company who received an email
regarding his/her payment authorization. The message informed the employee that their
direct deposit information may need to be updated or a delay in payment may occur. The
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story was unclear whether there was an incident that followed. This could be a phishing
attempt to collect private information. Although, this may never happen, once a year
organizations send an email communication to encourage employees not to share their
private information. To protect against phishing scams, users are discouraged from
sharing their own sensitive information. Also companies may have policies and
procedures to increase employee awareness of this threat.
Table 32 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented
in the abstract version of scenario 2.
Table 32: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Abstract Version of
Scenario 2
Dimension

Scenario terms

Distance

Temporal

Events are in the future or
happened in the past: several
months ago

High

Spatial

Events are in an organization
somewhere else

High

Social

Events happening to random
person (an employee in an
organization)

High

Hypothetical

Maybe the event will never happen

High

APPENDIX C
Instruments
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Study One Instrument
Consent Form
You are invited to participate in a web-based online survey on information security. This
is a research project being conducted by Ashraf Mady, for the doctoral dissertation at
Kennesaw State University. It should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Participation
Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You may refuse to take part in the research
or exit the survey at any time without penalty.
Benefits
You will receive course credit for participating in this research study. Randomly, 10
participants each will receive a $10 Starbucks gift card. Also, your responses may help us
learn more about the human behavior side of information security.
Risks
The risk from participating in this survey is minimal risk. The probability and magnitude
of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves
than those ordinarily encountered in daily life.
Confidentiality
Your survey answers will be sent to a link at Qualtrics.com where data will be stored in a
password protected electronic format. Qualtrics does not collect any identifying
information such as your name, email address, or IP address. Therefore, your responses
will remain anonymous. No one will be able to identify you or your answers, and no one
will know whether or not you participated in the study.
Contacts
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact me
via email at anm9230@students.kennesaw.edu or my research supervisor, Professor
Saurabh Gupta via email at sgupta7@kennesaw.edu
Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out
under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding
these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State
University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268.
Please select your choice below. Selecting "Yes I agree to participate" indicates that
 You have read the above information
 You voluntarily agree to participate
Electronic Consent Selection:
o Yes I agree to participate
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o No I do not agree to participate (if this response is selected you will automatically
exit the survey)
Students who select “No I do not agree to participate” will immediately exit the survey.
Students who select “Yes I agree to participate” will be directed to complete the survey
below:
Gender
o
o
o
o

Male
Female
Other
Prefer not to disclose

Age
o
o
o
o
o
o

Under 18
18 - 21
22 - 30
31 - 40
41 - 50
Over 50

Academic Class
o
o
o
o

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

Major
▼ please select major:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Accounting
Computer Science
Finance
Information Systems
Management
Marketing
Other
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Describe your level of computer experience
o
o
o
o
o

Not at all Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Extremely Familiar
Expert

Imagine that you have to make a tough decision that involves trade-offs such as money or
opportunity. Please read the questions below and rate your tendency to choose a risky
alternative.

I tend to choose a risky alternative...
Never

Rarely

Sometimes

About
half the
time

Most of
the time

Often

Always

based on
the
assessment
of others.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

that could
have a
major
impact on
me.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

that has the
potential to
backfire.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

even when
aware that I
am missing
several
pieces of
information.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Group 1 Concrete Scenario

This study will randomly present two scenarios to you. Each scenario will describe, in a
similar way, a specific situation. Please watch the scenario and imagine yourself in this
scenario. Below is the script for the concrete scenario:
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You are a College of Business university student. This is the last week of classes and
finals are next week. You are currently enrolled in a capstone project class. All students
must successfully complete this class in order to graduate. The deadline for the complete
project submission is in two days.
Today you just learned about what happened to a close friend of yours who is also
finishing the capstone project. Last night as your friend was doing some last-minute
internet research, his / her computer was suddenly locked. A message on the computer
told your friend to pay $2000.00 to unlock the computer. Without unlocking the
computer, your friend is unlikely to be able to finish the project and graduate. You are in
the middle of the same project with some internet research left to do.
The university utilizes its official email system and its secure learning portal to
communicate mitigating actions and periodically directs students’ attention to avoid
various malicious security threats such as this one. The university suggests the following
actions to protect oneself from this specific threat:





Don’t visit or download materials from untrusted websites
Make sure your anti-malware/antivirus is up-to-date
Backup critical files using cloud storage
When suspicious view training videos or contact the university information
security office for immediate help

Training is always available online in the university’s website and in the designated IT
training location across campus, or by phone using the university’s security hotline.
Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions:

I believe that the risk from malicious websites would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

immediate.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personal.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

realistic.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

distant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree
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I could imagine malicious websites attacks...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

happening
now.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
to me.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
nearby.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

actually
happening.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

I think the damage from malicious websites attacks would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

close to
home.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personally
relevant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

instantaneous.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

hypothetical.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or
abstractness
Extremely abstract
o
o
o
o
o
o

Abstract
Somewhat abstract
Neither concrete nor abstract
Somewhat concrete
Concrete
Extremely concrete
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I believe that protecting myself from malicious websites attacks would...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

complicate
my existing
job tasks.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
current job
mentally
demanding.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

require a lot
of thought
and
problemsolving.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
existing job
more
challenging.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

increase the
difficulty of
my current
job.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I am motivated to protect my information from malicious websites attacks now.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from malicious
websites attacks immediately.
o Strongly disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
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o
o
o
o

Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I have high intentions to prevent malicious websites from being successful.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I predict that I will immediately protect my information from malicious websites.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I intend to promptly protect my information from malicious websites.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Comparative Analysis

My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats.
o Strongly disagree
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o
o
o
o
o
o

Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information
and information systems.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information
security threats.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are
severe.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree
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In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and
information systems are severe.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are serious.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are significant.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information
and information systems is easy.
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
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o Strongly agree
I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information
systems from information security violations.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from
information security threats are effective.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s
information and information systems from security violations are effective.
o Strongly disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
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o
o
o
o

Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Group 1 Abstract Scenario

Please watch the scenario below that describes a certain situation. Imagine yourself in
this scenario.
Below is the script for the scenario:
Please read the scenario below that describes a certain situation. Imagine yourself in this
scenario. After reading this scenario, please respond to the following questions.
You are a College of Business university student. Next year you may plan to register for
the capstone project class. It is optional for students to complete the capstone project
class before graduation. If you choose to enroll, the deadline for the capstone project will
be at the end of next year.
As you work on researching for your project, you remember having heard a story some
time ago about something happened to a large corporation. What might have happened
was that an employee of a company was doing some internet research when the
company’s computer that the employee was using was suddenly locked. A message on
the computer told the employee that his/her company needed to pay money to unlock the
computer. Without unlocking the computer, the company was unlikely to be able to gain
access to files on this computer. Next year, if you are in the capstone project, you may
need to do some internet search for the project work.
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The university offers general guidelines to increase students’ awareness about potential
malicious software. The university does not communicate specific actions about
information security threats that external companies may deal with, as this threat may not
target students. The university suggests reading their monthly information security
newsletter to be familiar with current information security events. The university relies
on students to use their discretion when it comes to protecting themselves from security
threats.

Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions:

I believe that the risk from phishing would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

immediate.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personal.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

realistic.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

distant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I could imagine phishing attacks...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

happening
now.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
to me.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
nearby.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

actually
happening.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I think the damage from phishing attacks would be...

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree
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Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

close to
home.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personally
relevant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

instantaneous.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

hypothetical.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or
abstractness
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Extremely abstract
Abstract
Somewhat abstract
Neither concrete nor abstract
Somewhat concrete
Concrete
Extremely concrete

I believe that protecting myself from phishing attacks would...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

complicate
my existing
job tasks.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
current job
mentally
demanding.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

require a lot
of thought
and
problemsolving.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree
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make my
existing job
more
challenging.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

increase the
difficulty of
my current
job.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I am motivated to protect my information from phishing attacks now.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from phishing
attacks immediately.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I have high intentions to prevent phishing from being successful.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I predict that I will immediately protect my information from phishing.
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I intend to promptly protect my information from phishing.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Comparative Analysis

My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information
and information systems.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree
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My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information
security threats.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are
severe.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and
information systems are severe.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are serious.
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
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o Somewhat agree
o Agree
o Strongly agree
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are significant.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information
and information systems is easy.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information
systems from information security violations.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o Strongly disagree
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o
o
o
o
o
o

Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from
information security threats are effective.
o Strongly disagree
o Disagree
o Somewhat disagree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Somewhat agree
o Agree
o Strongly agree
The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s
information and information systems from security violations are effective.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

In your opinion, what was the difference between the two scenarios and did this impact
your perception of the communicated threat?
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________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Group 2 Abstract Scenario

This study will randomly present two scenarios to you. Each scenario will describe, in a
similar way, a specific situation. Please watch the scenario and imagine yourself in this
scenario. Below is the script for the abstract scenario:

Last year you heard a story about a worker at a company who received an email
regarding his/her payment authorization. The message informed the employee that their
direct deposit information may need to be updated or a delay in payment may occur. The
story was unclear whether there was an incident that followed. This could be a phishing
attempt to collect private information. Although, this may never happen, once a year
organizations send an email communication to encourage employees not to share their
private information. To protect against phishing scams, users are discouraged from
sharing their own sensitive information. Also companies may have policies and
procedures to increase employee awareness of this threat.

Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions:

I believe that the risk from malicious websites would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

immediate.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personal.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

realistic.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree
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o

distant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

I could imagine malicious websites attacks...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

happening
now.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
to me.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
nearby.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

actually
happening.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

I think the damage from malicious websites attacks would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

close to
home.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personally
relevant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

instantaneous.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

hypothetical.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or
abstractness
o
o
o
o
o

Extremely abstract
Abstract
Somewhat abstract
Neither concrete nor abstract
Somewhat concrete
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o Concrete
o Extremely concrete
I believe that protecting myself from malicious websites attacks would...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

complicate
my existing
job tasks.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
current job
mentally
demanding.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

require a lot
of thought
and
problemsolving.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
existing job
more
challenging.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

increase the
difficulty of
my current
job.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I am motivated to protect my information from malicious websites attacks now.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from malicious
websites attacks immediately.
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I have high intentions to prevent malicious websites from being successful.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I predict that I will immediately protect my information from malicious websites.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I intend to promptly protect my information from malicious websites.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Comparative Analysis
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My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information
and information systems.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information
security threats.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are
severe.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree
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In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and
information systems are severe.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are serious.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are significant.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information
and information systems is easy.
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
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o Somewhat agree
o Agree
o Strongly agree
I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information
systems from information security violations.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from
information security threats are effective.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s
information and information systems from security violations are effective.
o Strongly disagree
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o
o
o
o
o
o

Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Group 2 Concrete Scenario

Please watch the scenario below that describes a certain situation. Imagine yourself in
this scenario. Below is the script for the concrete scenario:

You are a College of Business university student. Today, your close friend and classmate
told you what just happened to him. This morning he received the following email:
You are receiving this email because you have authorized the university payroll to pay
you through direct deposit. Due to recent system update, your direct deposit routing and
account numbers will need to be updated by Friday. Failure to do so will stop the direct
deposit access. Any unprocessed payments will be deferred to the following pay cycle.
For timely payments and successful direct deposit of your paycheck, please make sure
your direct deposit information are updated immediately. To update your direct deposit
information please click on the link below and verify account information.
https://payroll.update-direct-deposite.edu
Remember to save your current information once update is complete.
Thank you.
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Payroll Team
He receives a paycheck every two weeks because he is a student worker at the college of
business. As instructed, he followed the directions. Few hours later, he received a bank
notification regarding an overdraft charge. When he inquired, he found out that his
account was accessed this morning and his current balance is $0.00. The transaction
timestamp shows that the activity took place soon after he updated the direct deposit
information. Your friend was a phishing victim.
Typical phishing message always claim to be from a recognized source and ask to verify
your information. It also contains a link to redirect the user to a specific website where
they can collect the needed personal information. To protect against this type of scam,
your organization created policies that prohibit the communication of any financial
information via email. Your organization also provides an ongoing security awareness
training that, among other things, explains how to detect such attack and discourages
users from communicating sensitive personal or corporate information. Also, your
organization created a two-step verification where the organization will send you a code
then this code will be used to get to the login page.
Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions:
I believe that the risk from phishing would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

immediate.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personal.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

realistic.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

distant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I could imagine phishing attacks...
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree
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nor
disagree
happening
now.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
to me.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
nearby.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

actually
happening.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I think the damage from phishing attacks would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

close to
home.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personally
relevant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

instantaneous.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

hypothetical.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or
abstractness
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Extremely abstract
Abstract
Somewhat abstract
Neither concrete nor abstract
Somewhat concrete
Concrete
Extremely concrete

I believe that protecting myself from phishing attacks would...
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree
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nor
disagree
complicate
my existing
job tasks.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
current job
mentally
demanding.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

require a lot
of thought
and
problemsolving.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
existing job
more
challenging.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

increase the
difficulty of
my current
job.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I am motivated to protect my information from phishing attacks now.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from phishing
attacks immediately.
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
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o Strongly agree
I have high intentions to prevent phishing from being successful.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I predict that I will immediately protect my information from phishing.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I intend to promptly protect my information from phishing.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Comparative Analysis

My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats.
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree

175
o Somewhat agree
o Agree
o Strongly agree
It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information
and information systems.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information
security threats.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are
severe.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and
information systems are severe.
o Strongly disagree
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o
o
o
o
o
o

Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are serious.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information
systems are significant.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information
and information systems is easy.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree
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I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information
systems from information security violations.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from
information security threats are effective.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s
information and information systems from security violations are effective.
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
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o Strongly agree
The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s
information and information systems are adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

In your opinion, what was the difference between the two scenarios and did this impact
your perception of the communicated threat?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Study Two Instrument
Consent Form
You are invited to participate in a web-based online survey on information security. This is a
research project being conducted by Ashraf Mady, for the doctoral dissertation at Kennesaw State
University. It should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Participation
Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You may refuse to take part in the research or exit
the survey at any time without penalty.
Benefits
Your responses may help us learn more about the human behavior side of information security.
Risks
The risk from participating in this survey is minimal risk. The probability and magnitude of harm
or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life.
Confidentiality
Your survey answers will be sent to a link at Qualtrics.com where data will be stored in a
password protected electronic format. Qualtrics does not collect any identifying information such
as your name, email address, or IP address. Therefore, your responses will remain anonymous.
No one will be able to identify you or your answers, and no one will know whether or not you
participated in the study.
Contacts
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact me via
email at anm9230@students.kennesaw.edu or my research supervisor, Professor Saurabh Gupta
via email at sgupta7@kennesaw.edu
Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the
oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities
should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb
Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268.
Please select your choice below. Selecting "Yes I agree to participate" indicates that
 You have read the above information
 You voluntarily agree to participate

Electronic Consent Selection:
o
o

Yes I agree to participate
No I do not agree to participate (if this response is selected you will automatically exit the
survey)
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Participants who select “No I do not agree to participate” will immediately exit the survey.
Participants who select “Yes I agree to participate” will be directed to complete the survey below:
Gender
o
o
o
o

Female
Male
Other
Prefer not to disclose

Age
o
o
o
o
o
o

Under 18
18 - 21
22 - 30
31 - 40
41 - 50
Over 50

Education
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
2 year degree
4 year degree
Master/Professional degree
Doctorate

Employment
o
o
o
o

Employed full time
Employed part time
Unemployed
Retired

What industry is the company you work for in?
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Business
Technology
Construction
Art and Design
Architecture
Government
Other

181

Years of professional experience with your current organization
o
o
o
o

Under one year
1-5 years
6-10 years
More than 10 years

What department do you work in?
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Information Systems/Technology
Marketing/Advertising
Finance
Business Strategy
Legal
Sales
Other

Describe your level of computer experience
o
o
o
o
o

Not at all Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Extremely Familiar
Expert

How often do you work with technology in your job? Technology such as Microsoft Office,
Email, Salesforce, Cloud-bases platform?
o
o
o
o
o

Never
Sometimes
About half the time
Most of the time
Always

Imagine that you have an opportunity that exposes you to a financial or a personal risk. Please
rate your risk-taking tendency below.
I tend to choose a risky alternative...
Never

Rarely

Sometimes

About
half the
time

Most of
the time

Often

Always
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based on
the
assessment
of others.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

that could
have a
major
impact on
me.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

that has the
potential to
backfire.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

even when
aware that I
am missing
several
pieces of
information.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

News reports suggest that organizations and their employees continue to face circumstances that
threaten the security of information/information systems. Such circumstances may threaten
information's confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Information security threats include
phishing emails for unauthorized access to sensitive information, malicious software that can
destroy critical data and suspicious websites that threaten data confidentiality.

Please pick a threat that you have heard about or have some experience with:

o phishing emails
o malicious software applications
o suspicious websites
For each question below, please think of your organization's information security policies and
training programs, then check the response that best characterizes how you feel about each
statement when you face threats from [Insert User Selected Threat].

My organization's information security policies and/or training programs help me...
Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree
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acquire
diversified
and wideranging
security
knowledge.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

accumulate
knowledge
of multiple
security
threats.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

gain a
variety of
technical
knowledge
about
mitigating
security
threats.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

My organization's information security policies and/or training programs
give me __________________ [Insert User Selected Threat].

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

in-depth
knowledge
about dealing
with

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

specific
technical
skills to
mitigate

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Strongly
disagree
thorough
understanding
and
experience
regarding

My organization's information security policies and/or training programs allow me to be
__________________ in finding solutions for threats from [Insert User Selected Threat]
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Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Somewhat
agree

innovative

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

creative

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

experiential

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I believe that the risk from [Insert User Selected Threat] would be...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

immediate.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personal.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

realistic.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

far away.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I could imagine [Insert User Selected Threat] attacks...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

happening
now.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
to me.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

happening
nearby.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

actually
happening.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

I think the damage from [Insert User Selected Threat] would be...

Agree

Strongly
agree
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Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

close to
home.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

personally
relevant.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

instantaneous.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

speculative.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

I believe that protecting myself from [Insert User Selected Threat] would...
Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
agree

complicate
my existing
job tasks.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

make my
current job
mentally
demanding.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

require a
lot of
thought
and
problemsolving.

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Agree

Strongly
agree

Solutions available to keep my organization’s information / information systems safe from [Insert
User Selected Threat] are successful.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The available measures that I can take to protect my organization’s information / information
systems from [Insert User Selected Threat] are effective.
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

The preventive measures available to me to stop [Insert User Selected Threat] threats are
adequate.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I am motivated to protect my information / information systems from [Insert User Selected
Threat] now.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information / information systems from
[Insert User Selected Threat] immediately.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I have high intentions to prevent [Insert User Selected Threat] from being successful.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

187
I predict that I will immediately protect my information / information systems from [Insert User
Selected Threat].
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

I intend to promptly protect my information / information systems from [Insert User Selected
Threat].
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Somewhat disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat agree
Agree
Strongly agree

APPENDIX D
Study Two Descriptive Statistics
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Table 33: Study Two Descriptive Statistics
Gender
Frequency
165
54
219

Female
Male
Total

Percent
75.3%
24.7%
100%

Age
Frequency
Percent
18-21
4
1.8%
22-30
45
20.5%
31-40
57
26%
41-50
59
26.9%
Over 50
54
24.7%
Total
219
100%
Education
Frequency
Percent
Less than high school
2
0.91%
High school graduate
25
11.42%
Some college
43
19.63%
2 year degree
22
10.05%
4 year degree
82
37.44%
Master/Professional degree
40
18.26%
Doctorate
5
2.28%
Total
219
100%
Professional Experience with Current Organization
Frequency
Percent
Under one year
14
6.39%
1-5 years
91
41.55%
6-10 years
37
16.89%
More than 10 years
77
35.16%
Total
219
100%
Computer Experience
Frequency
Percent
Slightly familiar
6
2.7%
Moderately familiar
73
33.3%
Extremely familiar
118
53.9%
Expert
22
10%
Total
219
100%
Technology Use in the Job
Frequency
Percent
About half the time
42
19.2%
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Most of the time
Always
Total

80
97
219

36.5%
44.3%
100%

40
5
5
4
22
143
219

18.3%
2.3%
2.3%
1.8%
10%
65.3%
100%

Industry Type
Business
Construction
Art and Design
Architecture
Government
Other
Total

